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Dodging the Taxman: Why the Treasury’s 
Anti-Abuse Regulation is Unconstitutional 
LINDA D. JELLUM+* 
To combat abusive tax shelters, the Department of the Tre-
sury promulgated a general anti-abuse regulation applica-
ble to all of subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986. The Treasury targeted subchapter K because unique 
aspects of the partnership tax laws—including its aggregate-
entity dichotomy—foster creative tax manipulation. In the 
anti-abuse regulation, the Treasury attempted to “codify” 
existing judicially- created anti-abuse doctrines, such as the 
business-purpose and economic-substance doctrines. Also, 
and more surprisingly, the Treasury directed those applying 
subchapter K to use a purposivist approach to interpretation 
and to reject textualism. 
In this article, I demonstrate that the Treasury exceeded both 
its constitutional and statutory authority. Congress neither 
expressly nor implicitly delegated to the Treasury the power 
either to direct a method of statutory interpretation or to 
codify the judicially developed anti-abuse doctrines. Hence, 
the regulation is unconstitutional. Alternatively, even if Con-
gress validly delegated either power to the Treasury, the 
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anti-abuse regulation exceeded the scope of any delegated 
power and is, thus, ultra vires. 
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Imagine that tomorrow the Treasury promulgated a new regula-
tion that directs all taxpayers to ignore the words in the Tax Code 
and instead pay the amount of taxes that Congress expects them to 
pay. Further, imagine that the regulation empowers the Commis-
sioner of the Internal Revenue Service (“Commissioner” and “Ser-
vice”) to reject tax returns that comply with the literal language in 
the Code, but violate its spirit. Finally, imagine that Congress never 
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delegated the authority to the Treasury to promulgate such a regula-
tion. Would this be a legitimate executive response to perceived tax 
abuse or an unconstitutional power grab? 
There is no need to imagine. In 1994, the Treasury promulgated 
a regulation almost identical to the hypothetical one in response to 
the abusive tax shelters of the 1990s. Treasury Regulation 1.701-2, 
the anti-abuse regulation, applies to subchapter K, the partnership 
chapter of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. Greatly simplified, 
the anti-abuse regulation permits the Commissioner to recast any 
partnership transaction that is inconsistent with “the intent of sub-
chapter K. . . .”1 The regulation defines the intent of subchapter K 
by referencing judicially developed anti-abuse doctrines unique to 
tax law, including the business-purpose doctrine and the substance-
over-form principles.2 
The anti-abuse regulation does two unusual things. First, it im-
poses an overarching standard on top of subchapter K’s rules, and 
in doing so, it fundamentally changed existing law. Second, and 
more surprisingly, the anti-abuse regulation directs those interpret-
ing subchapter K to use purposivism and to reject textualism. This 
directive squarely raises the questions of how tax statutes ought to 
be interpreted and of who ought to choose the interpretive method. 
At bottom, the regulation pits textualism against purposivism, rules 
against standards, and the judiciary against the executive. 
In 2010, Congress codified the economic-substance doctrine.3 
Oddly, Congress did not clearly identify when its new statute ap-
plies; rather, courts have complete discretion regarding the statute’s 
application.4 Because the statute provides no guidance, the Treasury 
and the courts may well turn to the anti-abuse regulation to fill the 
                                                                                                             
 1 Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 (1995). 
 2 Id. §1.701-2(a). 
 3 I.R.C. § 7701 (West 2014). 
 4 Pursuant to § 7701(o)(1), the economic substance doctrine applies when-
ever it is “relevant.” Id. § 7701(o)(1). Relevancy is not defined; however, the stat-
ute states that the decision of “whether the economic[-]substance doctrine is rele-
vant to a transaction shall be made in the same manner as if [the codified eco-
nomic-substance doctrine] had never been enacted.” Id. § 7701(o)(5)(C). 
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gaps when applicability of the economic-substance statute is uncer-
tain. Indeed, in Nevada Partners Fund, L.L.C. v. United States, the 
Service did just that.5 
However, the anti-abuse regulation should not fill those gaps be-
cause it is unconstitutional or, alternatively, ultra vires. In this Arti-
cle, I explain that because Congress never delegated authority to the 
Treasury to issue the anti-abuse regulation, the regulation is uncon-
stitutional. Moreover, even if Congress implicitly delegated such au-
thority, the Treasury’s regulation exceeded the bounds of that dele-
gation, making the regulation ultra vires. In exploring these con-
cerns, I examine a question never before addressed in either the ac-
ademic literature or jurisprudence: when agencies discern the legis-
lative intent or statutory purpose for a group of related statutes, in 
this case seventy-two separate statutes making up subchapter K, is 
their determination entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.?6 In my opinion, the an-
swer to that question is no; agencies are entitled to Chevron defer-
ence when they interpret ambiguous statutory language in a statute, 
not when they discern the statutory purpose or legislative intent for 
a group of statutes. 
In Part I of this Article, I introduce the problem that led to the 
regulation: abusive tax shelters of the 1990s. Because the tax shel-
ters of the ‘90s differed from those of the ‘70s and ‘80s, a new ap-
proach was needed.7 To combat this new form of tax shelter, the 
Treasury chose a standards-based approach.8 In Part II, I explain 
why the agency selected a standards-based approach and why the 
agency targeted subchapter K. While abusive tax shelters were not 
unique to partnerships, subchapter K was a logical chapter for the 
Treasury to target because tax avoidance is one reason taxpayers 
choose this particular business entity.9 Moreover, unique aspects of 
the partnership tax laws—including its aggregate-entity dichot-
omy—allow for innovative tax manipulation.10 
                                                                                                             
 5 Nev. Partners Fund, L.L.C. ex rel. Sapphire II, Inc. v. United States ex rel. 
IRS, 720 F.3d 594, 606 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 6 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 7 See infra note 41. 
 8 See infra text accompanying notes 66–74. 
 9 See Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 890 F.2d 848, 853 (6th Cir. 1989), 
rev’d, 499 U.S. 554 (1991). 
 10 See infra notes 59 & 64. 
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Next, in Part III, I describe the proposed regulation, the outrage 
it caused, the changes that were made, and the final regulation. The 
final regulation permits the Commissioner to recast a partnership 
transaction used in a manner inconsistent with “the intent of sub-
chapter K.”11 The final regulation included two provisions that raise 
constitutional questions: (1) one directs interpreters of subchapter K 
to use purposivism, and (2) the other defines the “intent of subchap-
ter K” by adopting and significantly modifying the judicially devel-
oped anti-abuse doctrines.12 
While the controversy and hullabaloo over the regulation’s 
promulgation were fierce, the regulation’s validity has been virtu-
ally ignored since its promulgation. Thus, in Part IV, I demonstrate 
that the Treasury exceeded both its constitutional and statutory au-
thority. Congress neither expressly nor implicitly delegated to the 
Treasury the power either to direct a method of statutory interpreta-
tion or to codify the judicially developed anti-abuse doctrines. 
Hence, the regulation is unconstitutional. Alternatively, even if Con-
gress validly delegated either power to the Treasury, the anti-abuse 
regulation exceeded the scope of any delegated power and is, thus, 
ultra vires. 
Finally, I conclude by conceding that abusive tax shelters are a 
problem and will continue to be a problem for a long time to come. 
While the Treasury’s goal in trying to stop the abuse is laudable, its 
response is a bold and unconstitutional power grab. 
I. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM: ABUSIVE TAX SHELTERS 
Tax avoidance is as “American” as apple pie and baseball. In-
deed, tax protesting predated the imposition of income tax in this 
Country; after all, the Boston Tea Party was an organized revolt 
against the imposition of a tax on tea. More recently, instead of 
dumping dried green leaves into a harbor, marijuana enthusiasts dis-
tributed 600 free joints as an organized revolt against Colorado’s 
attempt to impose a tax on that drug.13 
                                                                                                             
 11 Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(b)(1) (1995). 
 12 Id. § 1.701-2(b), (e)(1). 
 13 Michael Winter, Tax Opponents Hand Out Free Pot in Denver, USA 
TODAY (Sept. 9, 2013, 10:53 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/na-
tion/2013/09/09/denver-free-marijuana-tax-protest/2790133/. 
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Since the federal government began collecting taxes, taxpayers 
have sought ways to minimize or avoid paying them, including em-
ployees from the Service.14 Taxpayers are reasonable people and, if 
given a choice, will choose transactions that minimize their tax ob-
ligations and maximize their income; their choice becomes improper 
when the transaction is one that is chosen only to avoid taxes.15 
Tax planning and minimization are inevitable, unavoidable,16 
and even acceptable.17 “[P]lanning to reduce taxes is not only 
proper, it is the sine qua non of a sound business plan.”18 To reduce 
taxes, taxpayers turn to the language of the tax laws. The tax code is 
a “complex and detailed set of statutes subject to traditional inter-
pretive analysis.”19 How much tax reduction and avoidance is legit-
imate? Tax experts fundamentally disagree, and their disagreement 
                                                                                                             
 14 Josh Hicks, IRS Paid Bonuses to Tax-delinquent Employees, Report Says, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-
eye/wp/2014/04/23/irs-paid-bonuses-to-tax-delinquent-employees-report-
says/?tid=hpModule_308f7142-9199-11e2-bdea-e32ad90da239. 
 15 Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the 
Search for a Silver Bullet, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939, 1949–50 (2005). 
 16 Scott A. Schumacher, MacNiven v. Westmoreland and Tax Advice: Using 
“Purposive Textualism” to Deal with Tax Shelters and Promote Legitimate Tax 
Advice, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 101, 107 (2008) (“[T]ax planning and minimization 
are both inevitable and unavoidable.”). 
 17 See Comm’r v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d, 293 U.S. 
465 (1935) (“Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as 
possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; 
there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes.”); United States v. Isham, 
84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 496, 506 (1873) (stating that when tax avoidance “is carried 
out by the means of legal forms, it is subject to no legal censure”); Knetsch v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 361, 365 (1960) (“The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease 
the amount of . . . his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law 
permits, cannot be doubted . . . .”) (quoting Gregory, 293 U.S. at 469); see also 
Edwin S. Cohen, Tax Avoidance Purpose as a Statutory Text in Tax Legislation, 
9 PROC. ANN. TUL. TAX INST. 229, 230 (1960). 
 18 Herman J. Marino, The Final Partnership Anti-Abuse Regulation: The 
Treasury Redefines the “Intent of Subchapter K”, 73 TAXES 171, 172 (1995). 
 19 Linda D. Jellum, Codifying and “Miscodifying” Judicial Anti-Abuse Doc-
trines, 33 VA. TAX REV. 579, 589 (2014) [hereinafter Jellum, Judicial Anti-Abuse 
Doctrines]; see Elizabeth Garrett, Viewpoint: Remarks on Anti-Abuse Rules, 74 
TAXES 197, 199 (1996); Brian Galle, Interpretative Theory and Tax Shelter Reg-
ulation, 26 VA. TAX REV. 357, 358 (2006). Tax exceptionalism—the notion that 
tax statutes should be interpreted differently from other statutes—has largely been 
rejected. See Kristin E. Hickman, Goodbye Tax Exceptionalism, 12 ENGAGE: J. 
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stems, in part, from a controversy regarding the best way to interpret 
the tax code.20 
Textualists wish to hold Congress and the Treasury strictly to 
the words in the Code.21 They argue that if a transaction complies 
literally with the law, then that transaction should be upheld, even if 
it is inconsistent with the law’s spirit or intent.22 They see no reason 
                                                                                                             
FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 4, 4–5 (2011) [hereinafter Goodbye]; see gen-
erally Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in 
Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537 (2006). 
 20 Like the controversy surrounding statutory interpretation more generally, 
the controversy surrounding tax law interpretation has exploded in the last twenty 
years. See, e.g., Steve R. Johnson, Preserving Fairness in Tax Administration in 
the Mayo Era, 32 VA. TAX REV. 269, 322–23 (2012); Steve R. Johnson, 
Auer/Seminole Rock Deference in the Tax Court, 11 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 4 (2013); 
Steve R. Johnson, Deference to Tax Agencies’ Interpretations of Their Regula-
tions, 60 ST. TAX NOTES 665, 665 (2011); Shannon Weeks McCormack, Tax Shel-
ters and Statutory Interpretation: A Much Needed Purposive Approach, 2009 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 697, 699 (2009); Steve R. Johnson, The Two Kinds of Legislative 
Intent, 51 ST. TAX NOTES 1045, 1045 (2009); Steve R. Johnson, Use and Abuse 
of the ‘Plain Meaning’, 49 ST. TAX NOTES 831, 831 (2008); Allen D. Madison, 
The Tension Between Textualism and Substance-over-Form Doctrines in Tax 
Law, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 699, 716–18 (2003); Andre L. Smith, The Delib-
erative Stylings of Leading Tax Law Scholars, 61 TAX LAW. 1, 2 (2007); Andre 
L. Smith, Formulaically Describing 21st Century Supreme Court Tax Jurispru-
dence, 8 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 37, 41–42 (2007); David F. Shores, Textualism 
and Intentionalism in Tax Litigation, 61 TAX LAW. 53, 53 (2007); David P. Hari-
ton, Tax Benefits, Tax Administration, and Legislative Intent, 53 TAX LAW. 579, 
580–81 (2000); Goodbye, supra note 19, at 4; Deborah A. Geier, Commentary: 
Textualism and Tax Cases, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 445, 450 (1993); Lawrence Zelenak, 
Thinking About Nonliteral Interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code, 64 N.C. 
L. REV. 623 (1986); Ernest J. Brown, The Growing “Common Law” of Taxation, 
34 S. CAL. L. REV. 235, 236–37 (1961) (describing the harm that can arise from 
undeviating literalness). For a general discussion of the merits of tax literalism 
and tax nonliteralism, see generally Zelenak, supra note 20 (urging the Supreme 
Court to provide better guidance on resolving nonliteral tax issues). 
 21 See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 19, at 199 (“[T]he language of the statute is 
the law, and if it is clear, in most cases it should be applied by the Service and by 
the courts.”). For an example of a textualist majority opinion and a purposivist 
dissenting opinion, see Gitlitz v. Comm’r, 531 U.S. 206, 213, 222 (2001) (major-
ity concluded that the text of the statute was clear, while the dissent reasoned that 
policy considerations should be taken into account). 
 22 Peter L. Faber, Faber Offers Views on Partnership Antiabuse Reg., 94 TNT 
167-9, Aug. 25, 1994, LEXIS; Lee A. Sheppard, Partnership Antiabuse Rule: 
Dirty Minds Meet Mrs. Gregory, 64 TAX NOTES 295 (1994) (describing a public 
hearing regarding the proposed regulations). 
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for courts to apply the judicially created anti-abuse doctrines23 that 
allow the Service to reconfigure business transactions based on their 
economic impact, as opposed to their literal form.24 
In contrast, non-textualists argue that textualism, particularly in 
its literalist form, fosters sham transactions that undermine the legit-
imacy of the Code.25 The detailed and highly complex nature of the 
tax laws create loopholes, allowing taxpayers to pay less in taxes or, 
in some cases, avoid paying income taxes altogether.26 Thus, non-
textualists believe that textualism encouraged the proliferation of tax 
shelters by offering them legitimacy.27 
Non-textualists further lament that this approach to tax compli-
ance involves little peril for taxpayers because the most they risk is 
paying taxes that they would have had to pay anyway.28 While the 
Treasury can assess penalties, the reasonable/good-faith exception 
hinders this option’s effectiveness.29 More commonly, taxpayers 
                                                                                                             
 23 See Jellum, Judicial Anti-Abuse Doctrines, supra note 19, at 589–604 (de-
tailing these doctrines). 
 24 See Noël B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters, 
24 VA. TAX REV. 1, 25–26 (2004) (“The courts would not have developed the 
economic substance doctrine if they had been using the textualist method of stat-
utory interpretation.”). 
 25 Id. at 20; see Joshua D. Blank & Nancy Staudt, Corporate Shams, 87 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1641, 1644–45 (2012) (noting that one problem for the govern-
ment is that the sham activities are entirely consistent with the letter of the law); 
Schumacher, supra note 16, at 101 (claiming that hyper-textualism “led too many 
advisors and their clients to review a position on a ‘can I get away with this’ anal-
ysis”); Zelenak, supra note 20, at 633; McCormack, supra note 20, at 699 (arguing 
that “courts should ask whether the results of the transactions (meaning the tax 
savings claimed) are within the purposes of the Code”); Brown, supra note 20, 
236–37 (describing the harm that results from literalness). 
 26 John F. Coverdale, Text as Limit: A Plea for a Decent Respect for the Tax 
Code, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1501, 1523 (1997). 
 27 Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 2, 20 (“The ascendancy of textu-
alism has had its greatest impact by facilitating the promotion and sale of ‘abu-
sive’ tax shelters.”). 
 28 Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 15, at 1940. 
 29 The reasonable/good-faith exception allows taxpayers to claim that they 
relied on legal opinions from tax lawyers to avoid paying penalties. See, e.g., 
I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (West 2010) (“No penalty shall be imposed . . . with respect 
to any portion of an underpayment if it is shown that there was a reasonable cause 
for such portion and that the taxpayer acted in good faith with respect to such 
portion.”). If audited, a taxpayer can “honestly assert that he sought the opinion 
160 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:152 
who are caught pay less than they would have paid had they not 
“cheated.”30 
Tax shelters involve transactions that allow a taxpayer to avoid 
paying taxes that are otherwise due.31 Just as tax avoidance is not 
per se unacceptable, tax shelters are not per se illegitimate.32 Con-
gress regularly allows taxpayers to avoid paying taxes to encourage 
specific behaviors. Likely, you have benefited from one of these ar-
rangements. For example, legitimate ways to shelter income include 
retirement plans, Roth IRA accounts, deductions for home mortgage 
interest, the Hope scholarship credit, and deductions for small busi-
ness research and development.33 Congress creates these tax pro-
grams to encourage specific social and economic behavior: the gov-
ernment wants people to save money for retirement, buy homes, go 
to college, and invest in the research needed to develop new compa-
nies.34 These tax laws allow taxpayers to protect, or shelter, income 
from immediate federal taxation; hence, they are called tax shelters. 
Yet, they are not abusive. Abusive tax behavior involves more than 
                                                                                                             
of reputable counsel and was assured thereby that the tax shelter scheme was con-
sistent with the requirements of the law.” Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 15, 
at 1941; see also LEANDRA LEDERMAN & STEPHEN W. MAZZA, TAX 
CONTROVERSIES: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 472–79 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing 
the reasonable cause exception for avoiding tax penalties); Schumacher, supra 
note 16, at 123–29 (describing opinion letters and relevant regulations). 
 30 For example, in March 2013, Ernst & Young LLP agreed to pay the United 
States $123 million to resolve a criminal fraud investigation into that firm’s al-
leged use of tax shelters to evade at least $2 billion in taxes. See Press Release, 
Dep’t of Justice, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Agreement with Ernst & 
Young LLP to Pay $123 Million to Resolve Federal Tax Shelter Fraud Investiga-
tion (Mar. 1, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-
announces-agreement-ernst-young-llp-pay-123-million-resolve. 
 31 Jellum, Judicial Anti-Abuse Doctrines, supra note 19, at 584. 
 32 Id. 
 33 See Leandra Lederman, W(h)ither Economic Substance?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 
389, 395–96 (2010) [hereinafter Lederman, Economic Substance]. 
 34 See generally id. at 394–95 (explaining that tax law seeks in some situa-
tions to measure taxpayer income and in others to alter taxpayer behavior); see 
also Kristin E. Hickman, Administering the Tax System We Have, 63 DUKE L.J. 
1717, 1725 (2014) [hereinafter Hickman, Administering the Tax System] (noting 
that many features in the code further social welfare and regulatory goals in addi-
tion to seeking revenue). 
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simply accepting government incentives to protect income; it in-
volves exploiting the tax laws.35 Examples of abusive tax transac-
tions include those that shift or strip income or basis, including for-
eign companies,36 those that creatively arrange financing, and those 
that involve sale-lease back arrangements.37 
So, exactly when is a tax shelter illegal? The line between legal 
and illegal tax shelters is blurred, so blurred that the Service charac-
terizes improper shelters as “abusive” rather than “illegal.”38 Be-
cause they can take so many different forms, there is no single defi-
nition or prototype of an abusive tax shelter. Consequently, rather 
than provide one global definition, the Code contains multiple defi-
nitions.39 However, a common theme runs through these definitions: 
                                                                                                             
 35 Tax avoidance differs from tax evasion. Tax avoiders use the tax laws to 
reduce the amount of taxes due by lawful means, while tax evaders deliberately 
misrepresent the true state of their affairs to the tax authorities to reduce their tax 
liability. See Assaf Likhovski, The Duke and the Lady: Helvering v. Gregory and 
the History of Tax Avoidance Adjudication, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 953, 994 (2004); 
Boris I. Bittker, Pervasive Judicial Doctrines in the Construction of the Internal 
Revenue Code, 21 HOW. L.J. 693, 696 (1978) (“[I]t is more common to contrast 
‘tax avoidance’ with ‘tax evasion,’ the former phrase denoting lawful modes of 
minimizing or avoiding tax liability, while the latter implies fraudulent behav-
ior.”). 
 36 Because tax rates differ in different countries, companies can set up sub-
sidiaries to absorb tax gains in countries that have no corporate tax, such as the 
British Virgin Islands. While companies generally pay a registration fee, they pay 
little to no corporate taxes. See PKF INT’L LTD., BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS TAX 
GUIDE 2013 1 (2013), http://www.pkf.com/media/1954323/british%20vir-
gin%20islands%20pkf%20tax%20guide%202013.pdf. 
 37 Interview Carl Levin, TAX ME IF YOU CAN, PBS (Feb. 19, 2004), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tax/interviews/levin.html. 
 38 In 1999, the Treasury identified some common characteristics of illegiti-
mate tax shelters: (1) Lack of economic substance or business purpose; (2) Incon-
sistent financial accounting and tax treatments; (3) Participation by tax-exempt 
entities or entities that receive a substantial fee to enter into the transaction; (4) 
Marketing activity; (5) Confidentiality; (6) Tax-saving fee structures; and (7) 
High transactions costs. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF 
CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS: DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE 
PROPOSALS v–vi (July 1999), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-re-
leases/Pages/report3095.aspx. 
 39 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii) (West 2015) (“[T]he term ‘tax shelter’ 
means—(I) a partnership or other entity, (II) any investment plan or arrangement, 
or (III) any other plan or arrangement, if a significant purpose of such partnership, 
entity, plan, or arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax.”); 
see also id. § 448(d)(3); id. § 6111(c). 
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abusive tax shelters are business arrangements where “a significant 
purpose of such . . . arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of Fed-
eral income tax.”40 
Regardless of how they are defined, abusive tax shelters were 
not new in the ‘90s, but their character changed in two fundamental 
ways from the tax shelters of the ‘70s and ‘80s: (1) the ‘90s tax shel-
ters exploited more tax laws and involved more sophisticated enti-
ties, and (2) tax advising became a profit-seeking activity.41 
The case of ACM Partnership v. Commissioner42 illustrates both 
the characteristics of the abusive tax shelters of the ‘90s and the new 
role that tax professionals had assumed. The case involved two well-
known corporations: Colgate-Palmolive Co. (Colgate) and its tax 
advisor, Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. (Merrill Lynch).43 The two 
formed an offshore partnership with a foreign corporation in which 
the foreign corporation held approximately an eighty-three percent 
interest, Colgate held approximately a seventeen percent interest, 
and Merrill Lynch held a nominal interest of less than one percent.44 
The partnership acquired $205 million worth of securities, which it 
then sold to a third party for $140 million cash and a $35 million 
                                                                                                             
 40 I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii). 
 41 The abusive tax shelters of the 1970s and 1980s typically involved upper-
middle income taxpayers who deducted non-economic losses from wages and in-
vestment income. Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 15, at 1951; Del Wright Jr., 
Financial Alchemy: How Tax Shelter Promoters Use Financial Products to Be-
devil the IRS (and How the IRS Helps Them), 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 611, 626–27 
(2013). For example, a profitable lawyer or doctor might become a partner in a 
farming business to offset legal or medical income. Because these tax shelters 
exploited specific loopholes in the Code, Congress used a rule-based approach to 
close these loopholes. Section 469 of the 1986 Tax Reform Act limited a tax-
payer’s ability to deduct losses from businesses in which that taxpayer did not 
materially participate. Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 15, at 1951; see I.R.C. 
§§ 501(b), 469(a)(1) (West 2014) (called “passive loss rules”). The abusive tax 
shelters of the 1990s differed in significant ways from these abusive tax shelters; 
the new tax shelters exploited more tax laws and involved more sophisticated en-
tities. See Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 15, at 1951–52; McCormack, supra 
note 20, at 707–08. 
 42 ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189, 1997 WL 93314 (1997), 
aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 
1017 (1999). 
 43 Id. at *5. 
 44 Id. at *12. 
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multi-year installment note.45 The partnership realized a huge capi-
tal gain from this purchase and sale, but because the foreign corpo-
ration owned eighty-three percent of the partnership interest, most 
of that gain was not subject to tax in the United States.46 After the 
sale, the partnership redeemed the foreign corporation’s interest so 
that Colgate then held ninety-nine percent of the partnership inter-
est.47 After acquiring the foreign corporation’s interest, Colgate sold 
the installment note, which resulted in a $110 million deductible 
loss, which Colgate used to reduce capital gains it had earned on the 
sale of a subsidiary in that same year.48 The Service disallowed the 
loss, claiming that Colgate’s sole purpose for the transaction was to 
reduce its taxes; therefore, the transaction lacked economic sub-
stance.49 Colgate filed suit. Although the transaction complied liter-
ally with the language of the tax law, the Tax Court disregarded the 
transaction because it failed the economic-substance test.50 
As abusive tax shelters like these proliferated, the Treasury 
struggled to respond.51 Previously, the Treasury and the courts had 
used the judicially developed anti-abuse doctrines to combat tax 
abuse.52 However, as tax shelters proliferated and changed, these 
doctrines proved ineffective, and repeated amendments to the tax 
laws proved fruitless.53 The Code had increased in length, detail, and 
                                                                                                             
 45 Id. at *15. 
 46 Id. at *19–20. 
 47 Id. at *23–24. 
 48 Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 15, at 1943. 
 49 ACM P’Ship, 1997 WL 93314, at *35. 
 50 Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 15, at 1945. In this case, the economic-
substance doctrine served as an extra-statutory requirement, meaning that in ad-
dition to complying with the statute, the taxpayer had to comply with the eco-
nomic-substance doctrine. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Amandeep S. 
Grewal in Support of Neither Party at 14–20, United States v. Woods, 134 S. Ct. 
557 (2013) (No. 12-562) (explaining “the differences between the extrastatutory 
and interstitial approaches to economic substance issues”). 
 51 Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 15, at 1946. 
 52 Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 
5, 5 (2000) (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.701). 
 53 See Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 15, at 1962 (“[E]conomic substance 
doctrine is simply too weak a barrier to protect the collection of income tax from 
assault by abusive shelter planners.”); McCormack, supra note 20, at 704. 
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complexity, as Congress attempted to address each creative new tax 
avoidance scheme.54 
Requiring the Service to respond using existing law forced it to 
play catch up to address each latest tax shenanigan.55 The Service 
would identify an abusive transaction, request a legislative response, 
wait for legislation or draft new regulations, and then apply the new 
rules prospectively.56 During this sometimes lengthy process, tax-
payers continued to use the abusive transactions. Because the gov-
ernment was “unable to keep pace with the imagination of tax pro-
fessionals and the sheer volume of taxpayer maneuvers [designed] 
to avoid the application of increasingly complex tax laws[,]”57 
something stronger was needed.58 The Treasury set its sights on sub-
chapter K. 
II.  FORMULATING A REMEDY 
A. Targeting Subchapter K 
Because the Government simply could not craft enough targeted 
rules to stem the abuse, the Treasury decided to develop a general 
anti-abuse standard for subchapter K.59 “An obvious question that 
                                                                                                             
 54 N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Tax Section, Report on the Proposed Partnership 
Antiabuse Rule, 64 TAX NOTES 233, 233–35 (1994) (noting that the partnership 
tax law grew incredibly complex as the government attempted to address abusive 
transactions). 
 55 See Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 15, at 1951. 
 56 See Joseph Bankman, The Proposed Partnership Antiabuse Rule: Appro-
priate Response to Serious Problem, 64 TAX NOTES 270, 270 (1994) [hereinafter 
Bankman, Proposed Partnership Antiabuse Rule]. 
 57 William H. Caudill, Ninth Circuit Invalidates Anti-Abuse Rule; Is Reg. 
1.701-2 Similarly Flawed?, 83 J. TAX’N 380, 380 (1995) [hereinafter Caudill, 
Ninth Circuit]. 
 58 The Treasury believed that regulating was needed to stop the “abusive” tax 
schemes. See Marino, supra note 18, at 172. 
 59 In 1954, Congress enacted the first version of subchapter K to simplify and 
add flexibility to partner taxation. Alan Gunn, The Use and Misuse of Antiabuse 
Rules: Lessons from the Partnership Antiabuse Regulations, 54 SMU L. REV. 159, 
159 (2001) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 65 (1954)). “Because of the hybrid 
nature of partnerships as a combination of entity and aggregate features in a highly 
flexible mix, it [was] inherently impossible to adopt specific rules that [would] 
prohibit all types of abusive partnership transactions.” N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Tax 
Section, supra note 54, at 236. 
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arises in analyzing the partnership anti-abuse rules is why the choice 
was made to focus on partnerships. That is, why was there no anti-
abuse rule developed for Subchapter C and other types of entities 
that are taxed under the Code?”60 
Certainly, abusive tax shelters were not unique to partnerships; 
however, many of the abusive tax shelters at that time involved part-
nerships in some form.61 Taxpayers choose this business entity, in 
large part, to minimize their tax obligations.62 Subchapter K was a 
preferred vehicle for abusive tax schemes, in part, because of its 
highly technical nature and its tax-avoidance features.63 For exam-
ple, partnerships are generally treated as pass-through, or flow-
through, entities, such that the partnership entity pays no income 
taxes.64 The Government did not include these features to encourage 
taxpayers to minimize their tax obligations or to encourage the pro-
liferation of tax shelters;65 however, taxpayers used the features in 
this way. Thus, the Treasury focused its regulatory reform efforts on 
                                                                                                             
 60 “The simple answer appears to be that partnerships are what were on fire 
at the time. That is, many of the transactions in the late 1980s and early 1990s that 
were perceived as ‘abusive’ and that involved potentially significant deficiency 
amounts involved partnerships, and the partnership anti-abuse rules were seen as 
a way to put this ‘fire’ out.” James B. Sowell, The Partnership Anti-Abuse Rules: 
Where Have We Been and Where Are We Going?, 89 TAXES 69, 98–99 (2011); 
see generally Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24. 
Sowell, supra note 60, at 98–99 (noting that the Treasury may have avoided craft-
ing a similar regulation for other chapters of the Code because it received such an 
extremely negative reaction from the bench and bar when it enacted the partner-
ship anti-abuse regulation). For a discussion of the controversy, see infra Section 
IV.A. 
 61 See Sheldon I. Banoff, Anatomy of an Antiabuse Rule: What’s Really 
Wrong with Reg. Section 1.701-2, 66 TAX NOTES 1859, 1860 (1995) (stating that 
“[p]artnerships have become the tax shelters of the ‘90s”). 
 62 Partnerships are generally treated as pass-through entities; the partner-
ship—as an entity—does not pay taxes, which helps minimize tax obligations. See 
JOHN A. MILLER & JEFFREY A. MAINE, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL 
TAXATION: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 530 (3d ed. 2013). There are other tax 
avoidance features as well. For example, because partnership formation is a non-
taxable event, formation has no immediate tax impact. See id. This is also true for 
corporate formations. See id. 
 63 Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 4. 
 64 See MILLER & MAINE, supra note 62, at 530. 
 65 Internal Revenue Service, Partnership Industry Coordinated Issue Sub-
chapter K Anti-Abuse Rule Regulation Section 1.701-2, 95 TNT 124-10, June 19, 
1995, LEXIS. 
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subchapter K. A question remained: how should the Treasury ad-
dress the problem? 
B.   Choosing a Standard, Rule, or Both 
In general, the Code contains a complex, detailed set of rules 
rather than a compilation of general standards.66 Rules and standards 
differ in significant ways, but “[t]he principal difference between 
the two is that the substantive content of the law is known before an 
individual acts in the case of rules, while the content of the law be-
comes known only after the individual acts in the case of stand-
ards.”67 
While the Treasury could have tried to combat abusive tax shel-
ters by drafting additional, narrowly-targeted rules, crafting more 
rules to combat this particular abusive behavior seemed foolhardy 
for a number of reasons. First, because tax abusers do their best to 
conceal their behavior, the Treasury is not always aware of abuse 
until long after it starts.68 Second, rule-based responses apply pro-
spectively, leaving the Treasury one step behind as it constantly tries 
to address the “latest tax gimmick.”69 Third, more rules add clutter 
and complexity to an already cluttered and complex area of the 
law.70 Finally, specific rules invite taxpayers to find new ways 
around the fixes.71 For these reasons, the Treasury rejected the rule-
based approach and instead added a standard on top of the existing 
rules.72 With its standard, the Treasury specifically targeted textual-
ism, especially literalism, because tax professionals had used it to 
                                                                                                             
 66 Coverdale, supra note 26, at 1521–22. 
 67 Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 55. 
 68 Daniel L. Halperin, The Partnership Antiabuse Reg: A Reasonable Step in 
the Right Direction, 64 TAX NOTES 823, 824 (1994). 
 69 Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 6 (noting that the Treasury can 
address the shenanigans in the tax-shelter area better by using a standard like the 
anti-abuse regulation). While rule-retroactivity could help, Congress has to spe-
cifically grant the Treasury the authority to issue retroactive regulations. See 
I.R.C. § 7805(b)(6) (West 2015); see also Hickman, Administering the Tax Sys-
tem, supra note 34, at 1719–20. 
 70 George W. Bush, Remarks in Colorado Springs, Colorado, 3 PUB. PAPERS 
2466, 2469 (Oct. 12, 2004) (“Speaking about the Tax Code, it is a complicated 
mess. It’s a million pages long.”). 
 71 Halperin, supra note 68, at 824. 
 72 Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 56. 
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become increasingly creative with tax avoidance.73 In sum, because 
the traditional rule-based approach had not stopped the abuse, the 
Treasury turned to a standards-based approach and promulgated the 
anti-abuse regulation.74 
III. PROMULGATING THE REMEDY: THE ANTI-ABUSE 
REGULATION 
A. The Draft Regulation 
On May 12, 1994, the Treasury and the Service issued a Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking (“NPRM”) pursuant both to I.R.C. 
§ 7805(a),75 its general authority to issue regulations, and to I.R.C. 
§ 701,76 which subjects partners, rather than partnerships, to federal 
income taxation.77 According to the NPRM, the regulation was be-
ing enacted to curtail the inappropriate use of subchapter K’s flexi-
bility.78 
The NPRM contained Proposed Regulation 1.701-2, which con-
tained two rules, collectively referred to as the partnership anti-
abuse regulation, or rules:79 (1) the Abuse-of-Subchapter-K rule, 
and (2) the Abuse-of-Entity rule. The proposed Abuse-of-Subchap-
ter-K rule provided that if entities formed a partnership or used one 
                                                                                                             
 73 Kenneth W. Gideon, Use, Abuse, and Anti-Abuse: Policy Considerations 
Affecting the Nature of Regulatory Guidance, 73 TAXES 637, 638 (1995). 
 74 Caudill, Ninth Circuit, supra note 57, at 380. 
 75 Section 7805(a) provides in relevant part: “the Secretary shall prescribe all 
needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of this title, including all rules 
and regulations as may be necessary by reason of any alteration of law in relation 
to internal revenue.” I.R.C. § 7805(a) (West 2015). 
 76 Section 701 provides in full: “A partnership as such shall not be subject to 
the income tax imposed by this chapter. Persons carrying on business as partners 
shall be liable for income tax only in their separate or individual capacities.” 
§ 701. 
 77 Subchapter K Anti-Abuse Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 25581 (proposed May 17, 
1994) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). The NPRM indicated that proposed anti-
abuse rules would be added to subchapter K “to prevent the use of a partnership 
to circumvent the intended purpose of a provision of the Code.” Id. 
 78 See Internal Revenue Service, supra note 66. 
 79 Sowell, supra note 60, at 69 (noting that the rules are also called the “part-
nership anti-abuse rules”); see, e.g., I.R.M. § 4.35.2.5.2.6 (2006). Because the 
term “regulation” is confusing when it is pluralized in this context, I use the plural 
“rules” or the singular “regulation” when referring to Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2. 
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in a transaction or series of transactions such that a principal purpose 
was to substantially reduce a partner’s federal tax liability in a way 
that was inconsistent with the intent of subchapter K,80 the Commis-
sioner could recast the transaction.81 Similarly, the Abuse-of-Entity 
language82 provided that taxpayers should not be able “to use the 
existence of the partnerships to avoid the purposes of other provi-
sions of the Code.”83 
Citing the legislative history of the Internal Revenue Code of 
195484 and the implicit intent of subchapter K for support, the 
NPRM generally stated that the intent of subchapter K was “to per-
mit taxpayers to conduct business for joint economic profit through 
a flexible arrangement that accurately reflects the partners’ eco-
nomic agreement without incurring an entity-level tax.”85 The 
NPRM stated further that Congress had not intended for taxpayers 
to use partnerships to achieve tax results that were “inconsistent with 
                                                                                                             
 80 Unfortunately, the Treasury did not use terminology precisely or consist-
ently. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(a)–(b) (1995) (using terminology such as 
“intent of subchapter K”) (emphasis added), with Subchapter K Anti-Abuse Rule, 
59 Fed. Reg. 25581 (using terminology such as “the intended purpose of a provi-
sion of the Code” and “the purposes of other provisions of the Code”) (emphasis 
added). “The ‘intent’ language is confusing because a collection of statutes cannot 
form an intent; rather, legislators, who are individuals, may form an intent regard-
ing a statute they are enacting.” Jellum, Judicial Anti-Abuse Doctrines, supra note 
19, at 606; see Gunn, supra note 59, at 163 n.21. Statutes, which are inanimate 
things incapable of thinking, can have a purpose or purposes but cannot form in-
tent. While related, purpose and intent are not interchangeable, and this language 
caused and continues to cause confusion and controversy. See, e.g., Garrett, supra 
note 19, at 199 (arguing that legislative intent does not exist). Critics pounced on 
the imprecise terminology, in part, because the idea of legislative intent is highly 
controversial. As one tax professional challenged, “One cannot discern a legisla-
tive intent for even one provision of the partnership tax laws; moreover, one can-
not legitimately ascribe an intent to an entire subchapter [subchapter K] enacted 
incrementally over the course of many Congresses.” Id. at 198. Likely, the Treas-
ury did not mean “intent”; rather, the agency meant “purpose” but used terminol-
ogy imprecisely. 
 81 Subchapter K Anti-Abuse Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 25581. 
 82 These rules were coupled in the proposed regulation, but were ultimately 
separated in the final regulation. Thus, in the NPRM, the Abuse-of-Entity rule 
was no more than Abuse-of-Entity language. 
 83 Subchapter K Anti-Abuse Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 25581. 
 84 Specifically, S. REP. NO. 83-1622 (1954); H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337 (1954); 
H.R. REP. NO. 83-2543 (1954) (Conf. Rep.); and S. REP. NO. 94-938 (1976). 
 85 Subchapter K Anti-Abuse Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 25581. 
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the underlying economic arrangements of the parties or the sub-
stance of the transactions, or to use the existence of the partnerships 
to avoid the purposes of other provisions of the Code.”86 Notably, 
the proposed regulation did not refer to the judicial anti-abuse doc-
trines in any way. 
The NPRM’s preamble noted the Treasury’s concern that tax-
payers were increasingly using partnership transactions to create tax 
benefits inconsistent with subchapter K and other provisions of the 
Code.87 Further, the NPRM expressed the agency’s concern about 
the rise of literalism to avoid tax obligations.88 Due to these con-
cerns, and somewhat astonishingly, the proposed regulation stated 
explicitly that, even if a transaction complied with the literal lan-
guage of the Code and regulations, the Commissioner could recast 
the transaction to further the intent of subchapter K.89 
The Treasury characterized the proposed regulation as merely 
“clarify[ing]” existing law and suggested that it would “affect a rel-
atively small number of abusive large partnership transac-
tions . . . .”90 The Treasury claimed that its purpose in promulgating 
the anti-abuse regulation was to target the limited number of taxpay-
ers who were entering “into partnerships for the sole purpose of re-
ducing their . . . tax liability, especially packaged partnership trans-
actions.”91 
Despite the Treasury’s assertions that the proposed regulation 
was merely a clarification and would affect only a small number of 
transactions, the regulation was highly controversial and was per-
ceived as administrative over-reaching and over-reacting.92 Indeed, 
                                                                                                             
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 25582. 
 89 Id. Recognizing that tax avoidance was inescapable, however, the proposed 
regulation also acknowledged that reducing a partner’s aggregate federal tax lia-
bility alone would not violate the intent of subchapter K. Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Marino, supra note 18, at 172. 
 92 See, e.g., William F. Nelson, The Limits of Literalism: The Effect of Sub-
stance over Form, Clear Reflection and Business Purpose Considerations on the 
Proper Interpretation of Subchapter K, 73 TAXES 641, 641, 651 (1995) (saying 
that the regulation “provoked unusual, if not unprecedented, opposition from tax 
professionals” and was “no less than astonishing”); Banoff, supra note 61, at 1859 
(mentioning “the vociferous response in letters and at tax conferences and profes-
sional associations pro and con (largely con); the contentious public hearing; the 
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the draft regulation caused major angst among tax professionals, 
whose “reaction was immediate and vociferous . . . .”93 Tax profes-
sionals criticized the decision to recast transactions that complied 
literally with the language of the tax laws even when those transac-
tions were not consistent with the Service’s understanding of the in-
tent of subchapter K.94 Others challenged the law as “grossly over-
broad,”95 uncertain, and vague.96 Still others charged that the regu-
lation was simply unnecessary given existing law.97 A few ques-
tioned whether the Treasury could constitutionally promulgate the 
regulation, but these concerns were vague and imprecise.98 
                                                                                                             
seemingly well-founded allegations of procedural violations in issuing and final-
izing the regulation; [and] the reaction to and criticisms of the final regulation”); 
Robert D. Comfort, Philadelphia Bar Tax Section Calls for Partnership Rule’s 
Withdrawal, 94 TNT 140-31, July 20, 1994, LEXIS (noting concern that “very 
few partnership transactions [would be] clearly safe from challenge under the anti-
abuse rule”). 
 93 Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 34; see also Richard M. Lipton, 
The Partnership Anti-Abuse Regs. Revisited: Is There Calm After the Storm?, 83 
J. TAX’N 68, 68 (1995) (noting that “verbal squalls erupted at the public hearing”). 
 94 See William H. Caudill, ABA Tax Section Members Say Antiabuse Rule Is 
Not a Valid Exercise of IRS Authority, 94 TNT 146-50, July 28, 1994, LEXIS 
[hereinafter Caudill, ABA Comment]; Marino, supra note 18, at 172–73. 
 95 Comfort, supra note 92. 
 96 See, e.g., Caudill, ABA Comment, supra note 94; Terence Cuff, Los Ange-
les County Bar Urges Withdrawal of Antiabuse Reg., 94 TNT 151-40, Aug. 3, 
1994, LEXIS; Robert R. Keatinge, Colorado Bar Association Members Call for 
Antiabuse Reg’s Withdrawal, 94 TNT 141-29, July 21, 1994, LEXIS; Ralph 
Weiland, TEI Urges Withdrawal of Partnership Antiabuse Rule, 94 TNT 140-21, 
July 20, 1994, LEXIS. 
 97 See, e.g., Keatinge, supra note 96; Elizabeth A. Case, Price Waterhouse 
Says Existing Law is Sufficient to Curb Abusive Partnership Transactions, 94 
TNT 141-33, July 21, 1994, LEXIS; Weiland, supra note 96; Marino, supra note 
18, at 174; Bankman, Proposed Partnership Antiabuse Rule, supra note 56, at 
271. In the revised preamble, the Treasury responded that current laws, which 
allowed for case-by-case response were inadequate because this approach favored 
those who were first to engage in arguably prohibited transactions. T.D. 8588, 
1995-1 C.B. 109. 
 98 See, e.g., Caudill, ABA Comment, supra note 94; Cuff, supra note 96 (stat-
ing that there “are sufficient statutory and judicial authorities already available”); 
cf. Caudill, Ninth Circuit, supra note 57, at 380; Bankman, Proposed Partnership 
Antiabuse Rule, supra note 56, at 270 (arguing that purpose-based interpretation 
should have no role in subchapter K (and the companion provisions of Subchapter 
C and S) because the provisions are so arbitrary as to only allow literal interpre-
tation). 
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In response, the Treasury made “numerous and significant tech-
nical and structural modifications.”99 Relevantly, the Treasury ex-
panded the definition of the intent of subchapter K by, in part, in-
cluding the judicially developed anti-abuse doctrines.100 In addition, 
the Treasury separated the Abuse-of-Entity language into a separate 
rule.101 Despite these changes, tax professionals were not mollified: 
“Considerable controversy continued to swirl even after the Regu-
lations were issued in final form . . . . The debate and rhetoric 
reached levels of acrimony that had not been seen within the tax 
community in many years.”102 Even former members of the Service 
and the Treasury weighed in on the issue, most of whom urged the 
Treasury to withdraw the regulation.103 
                                                                                                             
 99 Sowell, supra note 60, at 72. 
 100 Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(b)(1) (1995); see Caudill, ABA Comment, supra note 
94. 
 101 Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(e). 
 102 Lipton, supra note 93, at 68; see also Banoff, supra note 61 (identifying 
nine things wrong with the anti-abuse regulation in its final form). 
 103 The following individuals urged that the regulations be withdrawn: former 
Commissioners of the Service Donald C. Alexander and Lawrence B. Gibbs; for-
mer Chief Counsel of the Service Abraham M. N. Shashy; former Chiefs of the 
Joint Committee Staff Mark L. McConaghy, Bernard M. Shapiro, and Harry L. 
Gutman; former Tax Court Judges William A. Goffe, Samuel B. Sterrett, John B. 
Williams; and former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy John S. Nolan. 
Additionally, Kenneth W. Gideon, former Chief Counsel of the Service and for-
mer Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, criticized the regulations, but stopped 
short of urging their withdrawal. See Donald C. Alexander et al., Commentators 
Say Partnership Antiabuse Rule Doesn’t Satisfy Fundamental Principles for a 
Workable Tax System, 95 TNT 175-28, Aug. 18, 1995, LEXIS; Lawrence B. 
Gibbs & John S. Nolan, Partnership Antiabuse Rule is Broader Than Necessary, 
95 TNT 175-27, Aug. 23, 1995, LEXIS; Kenneth W. Gideon, Wilmer, Cutler & 
Pickering Attorney Says Partnership Antiabuse Rule Encourages ‘Standardless 
Challenges’ by IRS Agents, 95 TNT 175-26, Aug. 29, 1995, LEXIS. 
  In contrast, former Chief of the Joint Committee Staff David Brockway 
wrote to support the regulations. David H. Brockway, Brockway Sees Necessity 
for Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule, 95 TNT 190-24, Sept. 18, 1995, LEXIS; see 
also Samuel C. Thompson Jr., Ex-Government Officials Challenge Partnership 
Anti-Abuse Reg: An Analysis, 69 TAX NOTES 1395 (1995) (explaining, analyzing, 
and rejecting the criticisms). 
  These prior officials articulated concerns about fairness, uncertainty, the 
need for a more targeted approach, and, most relevantly, constitutional over-
reaching. See Alexander, supra note 103, at 2. 
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B.   The Final Regulation 
The final regulation was promulgated on December 29, 1994.104 
The operative rules remained largely unchanged: if taxpayers 
formed a partnership or used one in a transaction or series of trans-
actions that violated either the intent of subchapter K or the purposes 
of another Code section, the Commissioner could recast the transac-
tion or disregard the partnership entirely, treating the partnership’s 
assets and activities as belonging to one or more of the partners.105 
The regulation was clear that other statutory and common law doc-
trines continued to apply,106 meaning that the promulgation of the 
regulation did not restrict the Commissioner from continuing to use 
other tax laws to challenge abusive transactions, including the judi-
cially developed anti-abuse doctrines. 
The final regulation included the two separate rules: (1) the 
Abuse-of-Subchapter-K rule, which permitted the Service to recast 
an abusive transaction for federal income tax purposes to achieve 
tax results that are consistent with subchapter K;107 and (2) the 
Abuse-of-Entity rule, which allowed the Service to disregard a part-
nership entity and treat the partnership as an aggregate of its partners 
as appropriate to carry out the purposes of any provision in the Code 
or in the regulations.108 Each rule is described in more detail below. 
First, the Abuse-of-Subchapter-K rule authorized the Commis-
sioner to disregard and recast a partnership transaction if (1) a prin-
cipal purpose of the transaction was to reduce substantially the part-
ners’ aggregate federal tax liability, and (2) the manner in which the 
liability was reduced was inconsistent with the intent of subchapter 
                                                                                                             
 104 Treas. Reg. §1.701-2. The regulation, as originally drafted, would have ap-
plied to the interpretation of any provision of the Code (income, estate, gift, gen-
eration-skipping, and excise tax) when relevant to a particular partnership trans-
action. See Subchapter K Anti-Abuse Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 25581 (proposed May 
17, 1994) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). The Treasury soon amended the 
regulation to apply to income taxes only (taxes imposed under Subchapter A). 
Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(h). 
 105 Treas. Reg. §1.701-2(b)(1). 
 106 Id. § 1.701-2(i). 
 107 Id. § 1.701-2(b). 
 108 Id. § 1.701-2(e). 
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K.109 To be consistent with “the intent of subchapter K,” a transac-
tion had to comply with the following three110 factors (two of which 
were adapted from the judicially developed anti-abuse doctrines): 
 The business-purpose factor: “The partnership must be 
bona fide and each partnership transaction or series of 
related transactions . . . must be entered into for a sub-
stantial business purpose”; 
 The substance-over-form factor: “The form of each 
partnership transaction must be respected under sub-
stance over form principles”; and 
 The clear-reflection-of-income factor: “[T]he tax con-
sequences . . . to each partner of partnership operations 
and of transactions between the partner and the partner-
ship must accurately reflect the partners’ economic 
agreement” and the tax consequences must clearly re-
flect income.111 
Generally speaking, if a transaction fails to meet any one of these 
three factors, the Commissioner can recast the transaction.112 The 
Treasury claimed that these three factors reflected the intent of sub-
chapter K because, when Congress enacted subchapter K, Congress 
intended to allow taxpayers to conduct joint business activities using 
                                                                                                             
 109 Id. § 1.701-2(b). 
 110 Because the Treasury subdivided the section into three subsections, most 
commentators identify only three factors. See, e.g., Marino, supra note 18, at 175 
(calling the factors “a three-fold requirement”). However, two of the subsections 
contain two factors, making for a total of five factors. See Lipton, supra note 93, 
at 68–69 (identifying five factors). Following the regulation’s structure, I use the 
term “three” rather than “five.” 
 111 Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(a)(1)–(3). 
 112 However, the clear-reflection-of-income factor contains an exception. Be-
cause some provisions of subchapter K and its regulations were enacted to pro-
mote administrative convenience or were enacted for other policy reasons, a par-
ticular provision may produce tax results that do not clearly reflect income. Lip-
ton, supra note 93, at 68. The clearest examples are basis adjustments under Sec-
tions 732 and 754. Marino, supra note 18, at 174. For this reason, the regulation 
states that if the business-purpose factor and the substance-over-form factor are 
both met, then the clear-reflection-of-income factor is presumed to be satisfied so 
long as “the ultimate tax results . . . are clearly contemplated by that [tax] provi-
sion.” Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(a)(3). 
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flexible economic arrangements without incurring a tax simply for 
forming the entity (known as an “entity-level” tax).113 
In addition to identifying these factors, the Abuse-of-Subchap-
ter-K rule explicitly rejected literalism: “even though the transaction 
may fall within the literal words of a particular statutory or regula-
tory provision, the Commissioner can” recast the transaction.114 In 
addition, the Abuse-of-Subchapter-K rule also provided more than 
ten examples illustrating its application.115 
In sum, the Abuse-of-Subchapter-K rule allows the Commis-
sioner to re-characterize a partnership transaction to achieve tax re-
sults consistent with the Treasury’s understanding of the intent of 
subchapter K. In doing so, the Commissioner should consider 
whether (1) a principal purpose of the transaction was to substan-
tially reduce the partners’ aggregate federal income tax liability, and 
(2) the transaction failed the three-factor test.116 
                                                                                                             
 113 See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(a); see also Internal Revenue Service, supra note 
65. 
 114 Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(b). Treasury Regulation section 1.701-2(b) identifies 
the ways that the Commissioner can recast the transaction, including by (1) disre-
garding the partnership; (2) not treating a purported partner as a partner; (3) ad-
justing the partner or partnership’s methods of accounting to clearly reflect in-
come; (4) reallocating the partnership’s income, gain, loss, deductions, or credit; 
and (5) adjusting the claimed tax treatment. 
 115 Marino, supra note 18, at 172. Shortly after issuance, the IRS withdrew 
two of the examples. Id. (citing IRS Announcement 95-8, I.R.B. 1995-7 (Jan. 23, 
1995) and T.D. 8592 (April 12, 1995). See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(d) (containing 
eleven examples). Eight of these examples are safe harbors, meaning that if a 
transaction is structured similarly to the example, then the Commissioner will not 
re-characterize it, while five of the examples illustrate transactions subject to re-
casting. 
 116 More specifically, the transaction must fail the three-factor test in light of 
the pertinent facts and circumstances of the particular transaction. These pertinent 
facts and circumstances are identified in section 1.701-2(c). Section 1.701-2(c) 
identifies non-exclusive factors and circumstances for determining whether the 
“principal purpose test” would be satisfied. See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(c). These 
factors include, among others, the purpose for the transaction, the aggregate tax 
liability of all the partners, and the intent of subchapter K. Id. However, the most 
important factor is the comparison of the business purpose for the transaction with 
the resulting tax benefits. Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 37–38. But 
see Lipton, supra note 93, at 69 (“Because these factors are nonconclusive and 
are ‘result oriented’ in that they focus on whether the partners receive a tax benefit 
from the use of a partnership—which generally will occur when a partnership is 
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The final regulation also included the Abuse-of-Entity Rule.117 
The Abuse-of-Entity rule provides that “[t]he Commissioner can 
treat a partnership as an aggregate of its partners in whole or in part 
as appropriate to carry out the purpose of any provision of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code or the regulations promulgated thereunder.”118 
However, the Commissioner may not reject a taxpayer’s decision to 
form a partnership to avoid another Code provision if that other pro-
vision clearly allows partnership treatment and the ensuing tax con-
sequences.119 With this proviso, the Treasury backed away from its 
position in the proposed regulation that an arrangement would be 
abusive per se if the taxpayer intended to “avoid the purposes of 
other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.”120 
When the Treasury first proposed the anti-abuse regulation, the 
tax bar fought back, alleging that the Treasury had exceeded its ex-
ecutive powers and had acted without constitutional or statutory au-
thority.121 Those who supported the regulation countered these chal-
                                                                                                             
used in a transaction—the factors provide little guidance beyond the tests set forth 
in the Regulations.”). 
  While there are often multiple reasons for structuring a transaction in a 
particular way, including reducing tax liability, the Treasury was concerned with 
whether the tax reduction purpose was “a principal purpose.” If so, then the reg-
ulation will apply and the Service may recast the transaction, although the Service 
is not required to do so. See Treas. Reg. 1.701-2(c). Thus, if the claimed tax ben-
efits are too favorable, even though the transaction served a legitimate business 
purpose, the Service need not respect the transaction. Cunningham & Repetti, su-
pra note 24, at 38. 
 117 In the final rule, the Treasury moved the Abuse-of-Entity language from 
the proposed regulation, which entirely ignored taxpayer intent, into a new sub-
section and modified it. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(e). 
 118 Id. §1.701-2(e)(1). Aggregate treatment would not apply when “(i) [a] pro-
vision of the Internal Revenue Code or the regulations promulgated thereunder 
prescribes the treatment of a partnership as an entity, in whole or in part, and (ii) 
[t]hat treatment and the ultimate tax results, taking into account all the relevant 
facts and circumstances, are clearly contemplated by that provision.” Id. §1.701-
2(e)(2). 
 119 Id. § 1.701-2(e)(2). 
 120 Marino, supra note 18, at 174. The Abuse-of-Entity rule also provided 
three examples illustrating its application. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(f). 
 121 See, e.g., Caudill, ABA Comment, supra note 94; Cunningham & Repetti, 
supra note 24, at 5; James A. Gouwar, The Proposed Partnership Anti-Abuse 
Regulation: Treasury Oversteps Its Authority, 11 J. PARTNERSHIP TAX’N 287, 
289–90 (1995); Comfort, supra note 92; Charles R. Levun, Chicago Bar Calls 
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lenges by suggesting that the Treasury already possessed legal au-
thority to act.122 Despite the rhetoric, neither side fully explored the 
constitutional or statutory issues at that time. 
Professors Cunningham and Repetti were the first to address 
these issues in depth.123 They concluded that the Treasury’s prom-
ulgation of the anti-abuse regulation was not administrative over-
reaching but was, instead, a legitimate exercise of executive author-
ity entitled to deference under Chevron.124 Their conclusion rests on 
two points: First, they declare that Congress has the constitutional 
power to tell courts to use a specific method of statutory interpreta-
tion to analyze a statute.125 Because Congress chose not to adopt a 
method, they continue, Congress left a gap in this area for the Treas-
ury to fill.126 Second, they assert that Congress could have codified 
the judicially developed anti-abuse doctrines.127 Because Congress 
chose not to codify these doctrines, they argue, Congress left a gap 
in this area as well.128 Under Chevron, agencies have implied dele-
gated power to interpret ambiguous statutory language and fill stat-
utory gaps.129 From this truism, Professors Cunningham and Repetti 
assume that Congress’s silence in these two areas empowered the 
                                                                                                             
Partnership Antiabuse Rule Invalid, Urges Withdrawal, 94 TNI 139-17, June 30, 
1994, LEXIS. 
  Critics argued that to the extent that there is uncertainty in the statutory 
scheme of subchapter K about the role of business purpose, economic substance, 
and the proper reflection of income, the regulation was not a reasonable interpre-
tation of congressional intent. See Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 39 
n.196 (collecting sources). 
 122 See, e.g., Bankman, Proposed Partnership Antiabuse Rule, supra note 56, 
at 272 (“The proposed regulation does not add any power the Treasury does not 
now possess, under a combination of common-law antiabuse doctrines and its re-
sidual power to interpret tax laws in light of their underlying purpose.”); Halperin, 
supra note 68, at 823 (stating “the Treasury and the IRS have the legal authority 
to issue the proposed regulation”). 
 123 Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24. 
 124 Id. at 5. 
 125 Id. at 5–6, 53 (citing Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statu-
tory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2130 (2002)). 
 126 Id. at 5–6. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984). 
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Treasury to issue both rules in the anti-abuse regulation.130 How-
ever, their arguments are flawed. 
Their arguments are flawed because an agency cannot legally 
act beyond its delegated authority. An agency may attempt to exceed 
its delegated authority in two ways. First, an agency may act uncon-
stitutionally by performing actions that Congress could not or did 
not delegate to the agency.131 For example, Congress cannot dele-
gate to the Treasury the power to appoint Supreme Court justices 
because the Constitution gives that power to the President (with the 
Senate’s consent).132 And, although Congress could delegate to the 
Treasury the power to regulate the environment, Congress has not 
done so.133 Were the Treasury to do either (appoint Supreme Court 
justices or regulate the environment), the Treasury’s action would 
be unconstitutional because the Treasury would be acting without 
any delegated authority. 
Second, and more commonly, an agency may act ultra vires by 
regulating in a way that exceeds the scope of the authority Congress 
delegated to the agency. For example, Congress delegated to the 
Treasury the authority “to regulate the practice of representatives of 
persons before the Department of the Treasury.”134 Pursuant to that 
delegation, the Treasury claimed it had power to promulgate a rule 
regulating tax-return preparers.135 The D.C. Circuit Court held that 
the Treasury exceeded its delegated authority because “representa-
                                                                                                             
 130 See Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 5–6. 
 131 Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Comm’r, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936). All leg-
islative powers are vested in Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. Hence, agencies 
cannot act absent delegation from Congress. Congress may delegate legislative 
power to an agency pursuant to the necessary and proper clause. U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 8. However, Congress must provide an agency with intelligible principles to 
guide the exercise of any delegated power. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United 
States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 
474–76 (2001). 
 132 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 133 Instead, Congress has delegated that power to the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7431 (2012) (requiring the EPA to 
regulate air emissions); id. §§ 300f–300j (requiring the EPA to establish minimum 
standards to protect tap water). 
 134 Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing 31 U.S.C. 
§ 330(a)(1)). 
 135 Id. 
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tives of persons before the Department of the Treasury” did not in-
clude tax-preparers.136 Because the Treasury exceeded the power 
delegated, the agency’s action was ultra vires.137 The action was not 
unconstitutional, however, because Congress delegated some power 
to the agency, specifically, the authority “to regulate the practice of 
representatives of persons before the Department of the Treas-
ury.”138 
The Treasury’s anti-abuse regulation is unconstitutional or, al-
ternatively, ultra vires. The regulation is unconstitutional because 
Congress cannot and did not delegate the power the agency claimed. 
Alternatively, if such power were properly delegated, then the 
Treasury exceeded the bounds of that delegated power and, thus, 
acted ultra vires. In the next two parts of the Article, I explain why 
the Treasury’s act was unconstitutional and why, alternatively, it 
was ultra vires. 
IV. PART FOUR: EVALUATING THE REMEDY 
The Treasury’s promulgation of the anti-abuse regulation is un-
constitutional for two reasons. First, Congress cannot delegate 
power that the legislature does not have. Because Congress does not 
have the power to tell the judiciary how to interpret statutes, it can-
not delegate that power to the Treasury. Second, Congress did not 
explicitly or implicitly delegate power to the Treasury either to tell 
the judiciary how to interpret statutes or to codify the judicially de-
veloped anti-abuse doctrines. Because the Treasury promulgated a 
regulation without delegated authority, the anti-abuse regulation is 
unconstitutional. 
                                                                                                             
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. at 1015–16. 
 138 31 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1). 
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A. Congress Cannot Delegate 
Congress cannot delegate power that it does not have,139 and 
Congress has no power to enact statutory directives.140 Statutory di-
rectives are laws telling the judiciary how to interpret statutes.141 
More specifically, theoretical statutory directives tell judges what 
theory, or approach, to use to interpret statutes: purposivism, inten-
tionalism, textualism, or something else.142 The Treasury’s regula-
tion includes two theoretical directives. One such directive is located 
within the Abuse-of-Subchapter-K rule. This directive applies to in-
terpretations of specific provisions within subchapter K. The other 
directive is located within the Abuse-of-Entity rule. This directive 
applies to interpretations of the entire code.143 
                                                                                                             
 139 Cf., Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 323 
(2000) (“[A]ny delegation must itself be an exercise of lawmaking authority, op-
erating pursuant to the constitutional requirements for the making of federal 
law.”). 
 140 See Linda D. Jellum, “Which is to be Master,” the Judiciary or the Legis-
lature? When Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. 
REV. 837, 886 (2009) [hereinafter Jellum, Which is to be Master]. 
 141 Id. at 847–48. 
 142 Id. at 848–49. Congress has not enacted a general statutory directive. For 
examples of state theoretical directives, see the following statutes: TEX. GOV’T 
CODE ANN. § 311.023 (West 2013) (purposivism); N.Y. STAT. LAW § 92(a)–(b) 
(McKinney 2014) (intentionalism); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-2z (West 2014) (tex-
tualism). 
 143 Professors Cunningham and Repetti suggest that the anti-abuse regulation 
includes a third purposivist directive as well. See Cunningham & Repetti, supra 
note 24, at 37. Specifically, they note that the Abuse-of-Subchapter-K rule in-
cludes a three-factor test to define when a transaction is consistent with the “intent 
of subchapter K.” Id. The first two factors are required (the business-purpose and 
substance-over-form factors), while the third factor (the clear-reflection-of-in-
come factor) is required only sometimes. Id. The clear reflection of income factor 
is not always required because certain provisions in subchapter K and its regula-
tions were adopted to promote administrative convenience or for other policy rea-
sons. Id. In other words, some provisions were enacted with the recognition that 
their application to a particular transaction could, “in some circumstances, pro-
duce tax results that do not properly reflect income.” Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(a)(3). 
Thus, pursuant to the Abuse-of-Subchapter-K rule, if the first two factors are met, 
the third factor is also considered to be met “to the extent that the application of 
such a provision to the transaction and the ultimate tax results, taking into account 
all the relevant facts and circumstances, are clearly contemplated by that provi-
sion.” Id. (emphasis added). Professors Cunningham and Repetti conclude that 
“this provision of the regulation in effect requires that the purposivist method of 
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The Abuse-of-Subchapter-K theoretical directive tells the Com-
missioner to reject textualism’s kissing cousin, literalism, and to use 
purposivism. This directive states that “even though the transaction 
may fall within the literal words of a particular statutory or regula-
tory provision, the Commissioner can” recast the transaction “to 
achieve tax results that are consistent with the intent of subchapter 
K . . . .”144 In other words, if a literal interpretation would frustrate 
the purpose of subchapter K,145 then the Commissioner can ignore 
literalism in favor of an approach that furthers the purpose of the 
statute. The Abuse-of-Subchapter-K theoretical directive applies to 
interpretations of statutes within subchapter K only.146 
Like the theoretical directive in the Abuse-of-Subchapter-K rule, 
the Abuse-of-Entity rule similarly instructs the Commissioner to use 
purposivism.147 This theoretical directive provides: “The Commis-
sioner can treat a partnership as an aggregate of its partners in whole 
or in part as appropriate to carry out the purpose of any provision of 
the Internal Revenue Code or the regulations promulgated thereun-
der.”148 Pursuant to this directive, the Commissioner can determine 
whether to treat a partnership as an aggregate of its partners or as a 
separate entity to further the purposes of any provisions in the Code 
or the regulations promulgated thereunder, so long as the tax results 
of that treatment “are clearly contemplated.”149 Thus, the Abuse-of-
                                                                                                             
statutory interpretation be used in analyzing subchapter K.” Cunningham & 
Repetti, supra note 24, at 37. Professors Cunningham and Repetti interpreted the 
phrase “contemplated by the provision” as requiring a determination of the pur-
pose of the statute. See Email from James Repetti (Aug. 1, 2014) (on file with 
author). It is not clear, however, that the statute requires a determination of the 
purpose. Why, for example, could one not satisfy this provision by determining 
what the statute contemplated through a textualist analysis of, say, the provision 
itself or the act as a whole? Hence, I am not convinced that it is a purposivist 
theoretical directive. 
 144 Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(b). 
 145 See supra note 80 (discussing how the Treasury inappropriately conflated 
statutory purpose and legislative intent). 
 146 Treasury Regulation section 1.701-2(b) speaks only of subchapter K, while 
Treasury Regulation section 1.701-2(e)(2) applies more broadly. See Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.701-2(b), (e)(2). 
 147 See Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 38, 51. 
 148 Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(e) (emphasis added). 
 149 Additionally, the Code or regulations must specifically allow for entity 
treatment. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(e)(2). 
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Entity theoretical directive applies broadly to interpretations of stat-
utes in the entire Code and its regulations. In short, both the Abuse-
of-Subchapter-K rule and the Abuse-of-Entity rule include pur-
posivist theoretical directives.150 
As a threshold issue, one might question whether the judiciary 
would be bound to follow purposivist directives the Treasury is-
sued.151 The regulation explicitly directs only the Commissioner, not 
the judiciary, to use purposivism.152 Likely, the Treasury can tell the 
Service to use a particular approach to interpretation without violat-
ing separation of powers. Moreover, the courts could simply ignore 
the theoretical directives in the anti-abuse regulation.153 Yet, were 
taxpayers to appeal a Commissioner’s decision that recasts a partic-
ular partnership transaction and denies benefits under either rule in 
the anti-abuse regulation, a court would have to review the Commis-
sioner’s decision. In reviewing that decision, the court would have 
to (1) determine whether the Commissioner had authority to recast 
the transaction under the regulation (a Chevron-type or Auer-type 
question) and, assuming the Commissioner had that authority, (2) 
determine whether that decision was valid (an arbitrary-and-capri-
cious-type question).154 If the Commissioner were to use a purposiv-
ist approach to recast a transaction that literally complied with the 
language of an applicable tax statute, a court refusing to follow the 
directive might well find the recasting invalid. Hence, although not 
                                                                                                             
 150 The summary section of the NPRM says specifically, “[t]he rule authorizes 
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in certain circumstances, to recast a trans-
action involving the use of a partnership to reflect the underlying economic ar-
rangement under subchapter K or to prevent the use of a partnership to circumvent 
the intended purpose of a provision of the Code.” Subchapter K Anti-Abuse Rule, 
59 Fed. Reg. 25581 (proposed May 17, 1994) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 151 Professors Cunningham and Repetti do not address this question but as-
sume the judiciary are bound. See Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 5. I 
agree. 
 152 Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(b), (e). 
 153 See, e.g., Evans v. State, 872 A.2d 539, 550 (Del. 2005) (finding that a 
textualist theoretical directive violated separation of powers and refusing to fol-
low it). 
 154 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012). Standard of review is a particularly murky area. 
For a discussion of the appropriate level of deference in economic substance 
cases, see generally Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, Economic Substance and the 
Standard of Review, 60 ALA. L. REV. 339 (2009). 
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explicit, the anti-abuse regulation implicitly directs judicial interpre-
tation as well as executive interpretation. Indeed, if the judiciary 
were not bound, the regulation would be largely ineffective. 
Assuming the judiciary is bound to follow these directives be-
cause of judicial review standards, the question becomes: “Where 
does the Treasury get the authority to instruct a court as to which 
method of interpretation it should use to interpret a tax statute?”155 
In my opinion, nowhere. Congress has no power to direct courts on 
how to interpret statutes.156 Because Congress cannot delegate 
power it does not have, the Treasury’s decision to adopt these direc-
tives is unconstitutional. 
Professors Cunningham and Repetti acknowledge that “it may 
seem inappropriate for the Treasury to instruct the judiciary on how 
and when the courts should apply judicial doctrines and what tools 
they should use in interpreting statutes.”157 Yet both professors be-
lieve that Congress has the constitutional power to enact statutory 
directives and that its failure to do so left this gap for the agency to 
fill.158 To support their claim that Congress has the power to issue 
such directives, Professors Cunningham and Repetti cite Professor 
Nicholas Rosenkranz.159 Professor Rosenkranz has indeed argued 
that Congress can constitutionally enact theoretical directives.160 As 
I have explained elsewhere, and as others have agreed, Professor 
Rosenkranz’s argument is misguided; Congress cannot enact theo-
retical directives without violating separation of powers.161 
                                                                                                             
 155 Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 5. 
 156 Jellum, Which is to be Master, supra note 140, at 882–83. 
 157 Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 5. 
 158 Id. at 53. 
 159 Id. at 53 n.283. 
 160 See Rosenkranz, supra note 125, at 2103–10. 
 161 Jellum, Which is to be Master, supra note 140, at 847; accord ANTONIN 
SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS 245 (2012) (saying that any attempt by Congress to direct statutory inter-
pretation would likely be unconstitutional); Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Founda-
tion, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273, 292 n.85 (2011) (“I entertain the possibility 
that statutory interpretation involves a judicial function implicit in Article III’s 
vesting of the judicial power in the courts.”); Maxine D. Goodman, Reconstruct-
ing the Plain Language Rule of Statutory Construction: How and Why, 65 MONT. 
L. REV. 229, 260 (2004) (“I join the ranks in believing construing statutes is what 
courts do and determining how to best perform this role should remain the prov-
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Theoretical directives violate the formalist and functionalist ap-
proaches to separation of powers. Were it to issue a theoretical di-
rective, Congress would violate the formalist approach to separation 
of powers quite simply because Congress would be performing a 
judicial act.162 Theoretical directives do not affect legal rights;163 
hence, they are not legislative in nature.164 Indeed, affecting legal 
rights is not a directive’s purpose. Rather, a directive’s purpose is to 
tell the judiciary how to interpret statutes.165 Yet, interpreting stat-
utes is a quintessential judicial act.166 Determining what sources to 
consider when deciding what a statute means is essential to the in-
terpretive process. Were Congress to craft a theoretical directive, 
like the ones in the anti-abuse regulation, Congress would interfere 
                                                                                                             
ince of the courts.”); Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Mother May I? Im-
posing Mandatory Prospective Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 20 CONST. 
COMMENT. 97, 99–100 (2003); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Continuation Coverage Un-
der COBRA: A Study in Statutory Interpretation, 22 J. LEGIS. 195, 210 n.103 
(1996) (“One unanswered question is whether Congress could pass a general in-
terpretive law stating that a particular method should be used to interpret certain 
statutes. Such an approach would likely be unconstitutional because it destroys 
the concept of separation of powers.”); REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION 
AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 263–81 (1975) (noting potential constitutional 
problems raised by interpretive acts); Alan R. Romero, Note, Interpretive Direc-
tions in Statutes, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 211, 221 (1994) (“At least some interpre-
tive directions might violate the principle of separation of powers between the 
legislative and the judicial branches.”); James C. Thomas, Statutory Construction 
When Legislation is Viewed as a Legal Institution, 3 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 191, 211 
n.85 (1965) (“When a statute seeks to control the attitude or the subjective 
thoughts of the judiciary, the separation of powers doctrine has been ignored.”). 
 162 For a more complete explanation of why theoretical directives violate for-
malist separation of powers, see Jellum, Which is to be Master, supra note 140, at 
882–83. 
 163 Article I vests Congress with “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted . . . .” 
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1. Laws “alter[] the legal rights, duties, and relations of per-
sons . . . outside the Legislative Branch.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 
(1983). Congress alters legal rights through enacting, amending, and repealing 
statutes. Hence, legislative power is the power “to promulgate generalized stand-
ards and requirements of citizen behavior or to dispense benefits—to achieve, 
maintain, or avoid particular social policy results.” Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth 
J. Cisar, “If Angels Were to Govern”: The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Sep-
aration of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 479 (1991). 
 164 See Jellum, Which is to be Master, supra note 140, at 882–83. 
 165 Id. at 848. 
 166 Id. at 888. 
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with a judicial function: interpreting statutes.167 “If officials in either 
[the executive or legislative] branches were given final say over stat-
utory interpretation . . . this would sabotage both the constitutionally 
prescribed law-making procedures and the constitutional separation 
of powers.”168 
Additionally, were it to issue a theoretical directive, Congress 
would violate the functionalist approach to separation of powers.169 
Functionalists fear undue encroachment and aggrandizement of one 
branch at the expense of another.170 Theoretical directives raise en-
croachment concerns because these directives impermissibly allow 
Congress to intrude into a core judicial function: interpreting the 
law.171 “Say[ing] what the law means”172 is not just a core function 
of the judiciary, “it is the most central constitutionally assigned 
function of the judiciary, as found in the vesting clause.”173 Theo-
retical directives raise aggrandizement concerns as well because 
they expand, or aggrandize, Congress’s role in the interpretive pro-
cess.174 Thus, theoretical directives violate functionalist as well as 
formalist approaches to separation of powers. Hence, Congress has 
no power to issue a theoretical directive.175 Because Congress has 
no power to issue such a directive itself, Congress cannot delegate 
this power to the Treasury. 
                                                                                                             
 167 Article III of the Constitution vests “[t]he judicial Power of the United 
States” in the courts. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Judicial power is the power to 
interpret laws and resolve legal disputes. “[T]o declare what the law is, or has 
been, is a judicial power, to declare what the law shall be is legislative.” Koshko-
nong v. Burton, 104 U.S. 668, 678 (1881) (quoting Ogden v. Blackledge, 6 U.S. 
272, 277 (1804)). Thus, “[t]he interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar 
province of the courts.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 523, 525 (Alexander Hamil-
ton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 168 Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A 
Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power Over Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1239, 1246 (2002). 
 169 For a more complete explanation of why theoretical directives violate func-
tionalist separation of powers, see Jellum, Which is to be Master, supra note 140, 
at 883–90. 
 170 See id. at 870, 875. 
 171 Id. at 883. 
 172 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 173 Jellum, Which is to be Master, supra note 140, at 883. 
 174 Id. at 886–87. 
 175 Id. at 882–83. 
2015] DODGING THE TAXMAN 185 
This outcome makes sense. The appropriate theory for judges to 
use when interpreting statutes is highly complex and controver-
sial.176 The choice, however, should be left to the judiciary, not 
usurped by Congress or the Treasury. 
In sum, contrary to Professor Rosenkranz’s argument, Congress 
does not have the power to direct the judiciary to use a particular 
approach to statutory interpretation. Because Congress has no such 
power, Congress has no capacity to explicitly or implicitly delegate 
this power to the Treasury. Hence, the Treasury had no delegated 
authority to issue the directives, and the regulation, or at least the 
directives within the regulation, are unconstitutional. 
B.   Congress Did Not Delegate 
Even if I am wrong, and Congress had the ability to delegate the 
power to issue theoretical directives to the Treasury, Congress did 
not do so. Nor did Congress delegate to the Treasury the power to 
adopt and modify the judicially developed anti-abuse doctrines. The 
Treasury has no power to act unless and until Congress confers, or 
delegates, power upon it.177 In this case, Congress did not do so. 
Administrative agencies are part of the executive branch; as 
such, they execute the laws that Congress enacts.178 Agencies may 
                                                                                                             
 176 For the classic debate between Professors John Manning and William 
Eskridge, Jr., regarding this issue, compare John F. Manning, Textualism and the 
Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 23 (2001), with William N. Eskridge, 
Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory 
Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 993 (2001) (criticizing Pro-
fessor Manning’s article), and John F. Manning, Response: Deriving Rules of 
Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution, 101 COLUM L. REV. 1648, 1651–
53 (2001) (responding to Professor Eskridge’s criticism). 
 177 Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. F.E.R.C., 372 F.3d 395, 398 (D.C. Cir. 
2004) (citing La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986)). 
 178 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986); accord Redish & Cisar, supra 
note 163, at 480 (“[T]he executive branch must be exercising . . . creativity, judg-
ment, or discretion in an ‘implementational’ context. In other words, the executive 
branch must be interpreting or enforcing a legislative choice or judgment; its ac-
tions cannot amount to the exercise of free-standing legislative power.”); Manhat-
tan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Comm’r, 297 U.S. 129, 134–35 (1936) (noting that exec-
utive power is the power to prescribe rules and regulations to carry into effect 
congressional will). 
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exercise only the power that Congress explicitly or implicitly dele-
gates to them.179 Pursuant to the delegation, or non-delegation, doc-
trine, Congress explicitly delegates power to agencies to promulgate 
regulations with the force and effect of law and ostensibly constrains 
that power by providing “intelligible principles.”180 Intelligible prin-
ciples guide and limit agency decision-making while also allowing 
for judicial review.181 Congress impliedly delegates power to an 
agency to interpret the laws it administers when it executes those 
laws.182 Thus, delegation may be express (explicit) or implied (im-
plicit). 
When Congress explicitly delegates power to an agency to elu-
cidate a specific provision of a statute by regulation, courts review 
the resulting regulation to see if it is arbitrary, capricious,183 or man-
ifestly contrary to the statute.184 In contrast, when Congress implic-
itly delegates power to an agency to fill statutory gaps or resolve 
statutory ambiguities, then courts review the resulting regulation un-
der Chevron to see if the interpretation is reasonable.185 Notably, 
however, without an explicit or implicit delegation of authority from 
Congress, both arbitrary and capricious review and reasonableness 
                                                                                                             
 179 Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 937 (1986) (“[A]n agency’s power is no 
greater than that delegated to it by Congress.”); Transohio Sav. Bank v. Dir., Of-
fice of Thrift Supervision, 967 F.2d 598, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“It is central to the 
real meaning of the rule of law . . . that a federal agency does not have the power 
to act unless Congress, by statute, has empowered it to do so.”). 
 180 See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409–11 
(1928). 
 181 WILLIAM R. ANDERSEN, MASTERING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 12 (2010). 
 182 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
843–44 (1984). 
 183 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). 
 184 Wright v. Everson, 543 F.3d 649, 654 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Chevron, 
467 U.S. at 844). 
 185 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44. 
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review are inapplicable.186 Without delegated authority, an agency 
has no power to act at all.187 
The next section (Part IV.B.1) explores whether Congress ex-
pressly delegated either power to the Treasury. The section follow-
ing (Part IV.B.2) explores whether Congress impliedly delegated ei-
ther power to the Treasury. In both cases, the answer is “no.” 
1. CONGRESS DID NOT EXPLICITLY DELEGATE 
Congress may expressly delegate the power to implement legis-
lative policy to an agency so long as Congress constrains that power 
with intelligible principles.188 Had Congress explicitly delegated the 
power to the Treasury to adopt an interpretive approach for inter-
preting subchapter K (assuming Congress had such power to dele-
gate) or had Congress explicitly delegated the power to adopt and 
modify the judicially developed anti-abuse doctrines, then the 
Treasury would have had the power to enact the regulation at issue. 
Yet Congress did neither. 
In the NPRM, the Treasury identified two statutes as providing 
authority for the agency to promulgate the anti-abuse regulation: 
I.R.C. §§ 7805(a) and 701.189 However, neither statute provides the 
                                                                                                             
 186 Id. (stating that where Congress has left a gap, “there is an express delega-
tion of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by 
regulation”); Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 
(1971) (“The court is first required to decide whether the Secretary acted within 
the scope of his authority.”); Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d 1075, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (“It is axiomatic that an administrative agency’s power to promulgate leg-
islative regulations is limited to the authority delegated by Congress.”) (quoting 
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988)). 
 187 All legislative powers are vested in Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
Hence, agencies cannot act absent delegation from Congress. Congress may del-
egate legislative power to an agency pursuant to the necessary and proper clause. 
Id. § 8. However, Congress must provide an agency with intelligible principles to 
guide the exercise of any delegated power. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United 
States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 
474 (2001). 
 188 Many suggest that the non-delegation doctrine is dead because the Su-
preme Court has not invalidated a federal statute on such grounds, notwithstand-
ing a number of opportunities, since 1935; however, Professor Cass Sunstein sug-
gests that the non-delegation constraint has been relocated within interpretation 
canons rather than abandoned. Sunstein, supra note 139, at 315–16. 
 189 See Subchapter K Anti-Abuse Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 25581 (proposed May 
17, 1994) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
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Treasury with an explicit grant of authority to promulgate the theo-
retical directives or to modify the judicially developed anti-abuse 
doctrines. 
Section 7805(a) does not expressly grant such power. Instead, 
§ 7805(a) delegates power to the Treasury to “prescribe all needful 
rules and regulations for the enforcement” of the tax laws.190 Pursu-
ant to this statute, the Treasury has the power to promulgate tax reg-
ulations with the force of law.191 Section 7805(a) is, thus, a general 
grant of authority to the Treasury to promulgate regulations. But the 
statute provides no explicit guidance on what those regulations 
should contain (other than that they be needful and related to tax).192 
Thus, § 7805(a) alone does not explicitly give the Treasury the 
power to issue theoretical directives, to codify the judicial anti-abuse 
doctrines, or, for that matter, to enact any specific rule. Hence, the 
Treasury must find that power in another, more specific provision in 
the Code, like § 701. 
Yet § 701 does not expressly delegate these powers either. Sec-
tion 701 provides simply that “[a] partnership as such shall not be 
                                                                                                             
 190 I.R.C. § 7805(a). Professors Cunningham and Repetti might argue that 
Congress explicitly delegated both powers (and apparently countless others) be-
cause the § 7805(a) specifically grants the Treasury the authority to “prescribe all 
needful rules and regulations for the enforcement” of the tax laws]. See Cunning-
ham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 48 (citing I.R.C. § 7805(a)). In their view, a 
needful rule for enforcement of the tax laws would include both a method to in-
terpret those rules and the power to codify the judicial anti-abuse rules. 
  Yet consider the breadth of power the Treasury would have were this ar-
gument correct. The Treasury might decide that a needful rule for enforcing the 
tax code is one in which tax return preparers are subject to licensing, or is one 
extending the limitations period for the government to assess a deficiency against 
a taxpayer for overstating the basis in property, or is one allowing employees to 
carry guns to audits for safety. See Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 
2014) (rejecting the Treasury’s attempt to regulate tax preparers); United States 
v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1839 (2012) (rejecting the 
Treasury’s attempt to extend the limitations period). 
  It seems unlikely that Congress intended to give the Treasury the power to 
enact any rule that the Treasury decided was needed. Rather, Congress likely in-
tended to give the Treasury the power to enact rules that Congress decided were 
needed to implement and enforce statutes. Cf. Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 
721 F.3d 152, 161 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that despite statutory language grant-
ing the NLRB the authority to issue rules “necessary to carry out” the provisions 
of a statute, the NLRB had no authority to issue a specific rule). 
 191 I.R.C. § 7805(a). 
 192 See id. 
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subject to the income tax imposed by this chapter. Persons carrying 
on business as partners shall be liable for income tax only in their 
separate or individual capacities.”193 Like § 7805(a), § 701 does not 
explicitly grant to the Treasury either the power to promulgate the 
theoretical directives or the power to modify the judicially devel-
oped anti-abuse doctrines. 
Thus, neither of the statutes, considered separately or combined, 
explicitly delegates power to the Treasury either to promulgate stat-
utory directives or to codify the judicially developed anti-abuse doc-
trines for subchapter K. Thus, if delegation exists at all, it must be 
implicit. 
2. CONGRESS DID NOT IMPLICITLY DELEGATE 
Not only did Congress not explicitly delegate either power to the 
Treasury, Congress did not implicitly delegate such power either. 
Congress was simply silent, and silence alone is not congressional 
delegation.194 
Without a doubt, congressional delegation of authority to an 
agency need not be express; it may instead be implied.195 Congress 
explicitly delegates authority to an agency to fill statutory gaps.196 
Congress implicitly delegates authority to an agency to resolve stat-
utory ambiguity197 because courts presume “that when an agency-
                                                                                                             
 193 Id. § 701. 
 194 Home Concrete & Supply, 132 S. Ct. at 1843 (“[A] statute’s silence or am-
biguity as to a particular issue means that Congress has not ‘directly addressed 
the precise question at issue’ . . . .”) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)) (emphasis added); Chamber of Com-
merce, 721 F.3d at 159 (noting that there is no presumption that Congress dele-
gated a specific power to an agency based solely on the fact that the legislature 
did not expressly withhold such power); Feller v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 497, 535 
(2010) (Gustafson, J., dissenting) (“Statutory specificity about one subject cannot 
sensibly be construed as gap-creating ‘silence’ about other subjects.”); Am. Bar 
Ass’n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 468 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (stating that requiring agencies 
to expressly withhold power would give agencies “virtually limitless hegemony”). 
 195 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
 196 Id. 
 197 As the Supreme Court noted, an agency’s power to administer a congres-
sionally developed program “necessarily requires the formulation of policy and 
the making of rules to fill any gap left . . . by Congress.” Id. Further, Chevron 
applies, we are told, when a statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the spe-
cific issue before a court. Id. 
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administered statute is ambiguous with respect to what it prescribes, 
Congress has empowered the agency to resolve the ambiguity.”198 
Hence, when a statute contains ambiguity and an agency resolves 
that ambiguity, courts use the two-step deference standard identified 
in Chevron to review the validity of the agency’s interpretive 
choice.199 
Pursuant to Chevron,200 a court determines at step one “whether 
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”201 In 
essence, Chevron’s first step asks whether Congress implicitly del-
egated resolution of any ambiguity to the agency or retained that 
power for itself.202 When applying this first step, courts do not defer 
                                                                                                             
 198 Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2439 (2014) (emphasis 
added). 
 199 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44. Not all agency interpretations of ambig-
uous language are entitled to Chevron deference; some receive Skidmore defer-
ence. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). Before applying 
Chevron, a court must make sure that the interpretation is one deserving of Chev-
ron. Agency interpretations made using force-of-law procedures are entitled to 
Chevron deference while those made with less formal process are not. United 
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001); Christensen v. Harris Cty., 
529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). Here, there is no question that the Treasury used force-
of-law procedures when promulgating its anti-abuse regulation because the Treas-
ury used notice-and-comment procedures. For a discussion of IRS actions that do 
not warrant Chevron deference, see Kristin E. Hickman, IRB Guidance: The No 
Man’s Land of Tax Code Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 239, 256–57 
(2009). 
 200 Congress’s general grant of authority to the Treasury under § 7805(a) to 
issue regulations necessary to enforce the Code provides sufficient authority for 
the Treasury to issue legislative rules interpreting § 701 and other sections of the 
Code. The Supreme Court recently held that the Treasury has the power to inter-
pret all the statutes it administers pursuant to its general grant of authority 
(§ 7805(a)). Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 
44, 56 (2011). Further, the Court held that the Treasury’s interpretation of a par-
ticular statute, like § 701, is owed no less deference when it is contained in a rule 
adopted under the general grant of authority in § 7805(a) “than when it is ‘issued 
under a specific grant of authority to define a statutory term or prescribe a method 
of executing a statutory provision.’” Id. (quoting Rowan Cos. v. United States, 
452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981)). 
 201 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. In other words, is Congress’s intent clear—how-
ever clarity may be discerned—or is there a gap or ambiguity to be resolved? 
Clarity is determined by “employing traditional tools of statutory construc-
tion . . . .” Id. at 843 n.9. 
 202 United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1843 
(2012). 
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to an agency’s interpretation at all. Rather, “[t]he judiciary is the 
final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject 
administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congres-
sional intent.”203 If the answer to this first question is yes, then that 
is the end of the matter, “for the court, as well as the agency must 
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”204 
If the answer is no, however, courts turn to Chevron’s second step. 
At Chevron’s second step, courts must accept any reasonable, or 
permissible, agency interpretation.205 
Importantly, however, agencies are not entitled to Chevron def-
erence for every interpretation they issue. Chevron deference is only 
appropriate when an agency interprets ambiguous statutory lan-
guage and when Congress has delegated authority to that agency to 
resolve that ambiguity.206 When Congress does not delegate such 
interpretive authority, agencies have no interpretive power, even in 
the face of ambiguous language.207 In sum, for Chevron’s second 
step to apply, a court must find at Chevron’s first step that Congress 
implicitly delegated resolution of any ambiguities to the agency.208 
                                                                                                             
 203 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. 
 204 Sala v. United States, 552 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1199 (D. Colo. 2008), rev’d, 
613 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43). 
 205 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
 206 See Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d 1075, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Mere am-
biguity in a statute is not evidence of congressional delegation of authority.”); 
Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 137 F.3d 640, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(“[Chevron] deference comes into play, of course, only as a consequence of stat-
utory ambiguity, and then only if the reviewing court finds an implicit delegation 
of authority to the agency.”); City of Kansas City v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 
923 F.2d 188, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (noting that “implicit delegation of interpre-
tive authority” and ambiguity are required before Chevron-step-two deference is 
appropriate). 
 207 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015) (noting that “[i]n ex-
traordinary cases, however, there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that 
Congress has intended such an implicit delegation [simply from ambiguous lan-
guage].”) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 
159 (2000)). 
 208 When Congress expressly delegates, then the proper standard of review is 
arbitrary and capricious review. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; ABF Freight Sys., Inc. 
v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 324 (1994) (“When Congress expressly delegates to an 
administrative agency the authority to make specific policy determinations, courts 
must give the agency’s decision controlling weight unless it is ‘arbitrary, capri-
cious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.’”) (quoting id. at 844). 
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a. Silence Is Not Delegation 
Professors Cunningham and Repetti suggest that Congress im-
pliedly delegated both powers to the Treasury through silence.209 
Regarding the judicially developed anti-abuse doctrines, the profes-
sors correctly point out that Congress could have codified these doc-
trines had it wished, but Congress did not do so.210 Regarding the 
theoretical directives, the professors erroneously claim211 that Con-
gress could have enacted theoretical directives telling “courts to use 
a specific method of statutory interpretation in analyzing a stat-
ute . . . .”212 Again, they note that Congress did not do so.213 From 
these two instances of congressional silence, the professors con-
clude that “the statute does not address the subject matter of the reg-
ulation[] . . . .”214 Because no statute addresses the subject matter of 
the regulation, Professors Cunningham and Repetti conclude that 
the first step of Chevron is satisfied; Congress did not speak to the 
precise issue.215 Hence, the only question remaining is whether the 
Treasury’s interpretation was reasonable, pursuant to the second 
step of Chevron.216 In short, the professors assert the Treasury had 
the power to promulgate the anti-abuse regulation merely because 
Congress did not expressly withhold that power.217 For the profes-
sors, silence satisfies Chevron’s first step.218 
I disagree. A number of courts have rightly rejected the argu-
ment that silence alone is sufficient to satisfy Chevron’s first step.219 
                                                                                                             
 209 Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 53. 
 210 Id. Congress did codify the economic-substance doctrine in 2010. Con-
gress codified the doctrine through § 1409 of the Health Care and Education Rec-
onciliation Act of 2010. 
 211 I disagree. See supra Section IV.A. 
 212 Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 53. 
 213 Id. 
 214 Id. at 54. 
 215 Id. at 53 (stating only that “[t]he existence of [the common law doctrines] 
and the use of the purposivist method of statutory interpretation . . . squarely con-
fronted Congress with the issue whether, as a policy matter, the doctrines should 
apply when interpreting the partnership tax provisions”). 
 216 Id. at 54. 
 217 See supra notes 209–215. 
 218 Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 53. 
 219 See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 502 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(“Courts encountering this kind of ‘whatever-it-takes’ approach to Chevron anal-
ysis in the past have rejected it.”); Am. Bar Ass’n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 468 (D.C. 
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For example, in American Bar Association v. FTC,220 the D.C. Cir-
cuit rejected this silence-equals-delegated-power argument. The 
statute at issue in that case empowered the Federal Trade Commis-
sion to regulate “financial institutions.”221 The FTC attempted to 
regulate attorneys, claiming that they were “financial institu-
tions.”222 The issue for the court was whether the FTC’s interpreta-
tion was entitled to Chevron deference. The FTC argued that be-
cause the statute was silent on this issue—meaning that it did not 
contain language specifically exempting attorneys or the practice of 
law from regulation—the FTC had the power to regulate both.223 
The court was relatively scathing in its rebuke of the agency’s si-
lence argument: 
As we have often cautioned, “[t]o suggest, as the 
[Commission] effectively does, that Chevron step 
two is implicated any time a statute does not ex-
pressly negate the existence of a claimed administra-
tive power . . . is both flatly unfaithful to the princi-
ples of administrative law . . . and refuted by prece-
dent.” Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n, 29 F.3d at 671 (empha-
sis in original). Plainly, if we were “to presume a del-
egation of power” from the absence of “an express 
withholding of such power, agencies would enjoy 
virtually limitless hegemony . . . .” Id. (emphasis in 
original). . . . 
We further recognize that the existence of ambiguity 
is not enough per se to warrant deference to the 
agency’s interpretation. The ambiguity must be such 
as to make it appear that Congress either explicitly or 
implicitly delegated authority to cure that ambiguity. 
                                                                                                             
Cir. 2005); cf. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 137 F.3d 640, 646 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998) (noting that “the [statutory] limitation to exporting or importing coun-
tries says nothing about the form of legal mandate”). But see Garcia-Carias v. 
Holder, 697 F.3d 257, 268 (5th Cir. 2012) (DeMoss, J., dissenting) (noting that 
Congress’s failure to codify the departure rule for immigration cases shows that 
Congress intended to delegate that decision to the agency). 
 220 Am. Bar Ass’n, 430 F.3d at 468. 
 221 Id. at 470 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 6809(3)(a)). 
 222 Id. at 465–66. 
 223 Id. at 468. 
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“Mere ambiguity in a statute is not evidence of con-
gressional delegation of authority.” Michigan v. 
EPA, 268 F.3d 1075, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citations 
omitted). The deference mandated in Chevron 
“comes into play, of course, only as a consequence 
of statutory ambiguity, and then only if the reviewing 
court finds an implicit delegation of authority to the 
agency.” Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 
137 F.3d 640, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (emphasis 
added). . . .224 
Following this rebuke, the court held that Congress did not, 
through its silence, implicitly delegate power to the FTC to regulate 
attorneys.225 
The Fourth Circuit similarly held that silence alone is insuffi-
cient to constitute implicit delegation and trigger Chevron’s second 
step.226 In Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, the court held that the 
National Labor Relations Board did not have authority to enact a 
notice-posting requirement.227 The NLRB argued that it had the 
power to promulgate its notice-posting regulation simply because 
Congress had not expressly withheld that authority.228 In response, 
the court noted that there is no presumption that Congress delegated 
a specific power to an agency based solely on the fact that the legis-
lature did not expressly withhold such power.229 As the court ex-
plained, the analysis is “whether Congress intended to grant [an 
agency] the authority to issue [a] challenged rule—and not whether 
Congress intended to withhold that power.”230 Thus, the court held 
that Congress must specifically grant authority for an agency to act, 
not simply remain silent.231 In sum, American Bar Association, 
                                                                                                             
 224 Id. at 468–69. 
 225 Id. at 469. 
 226 Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 721 F.3d 152, 160 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 227 Id. at 154. 
 228 Id. at 159. 
 229 Id. at 160. 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id. (citing Am. Bar Ass’n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 468 (D.C. Cir. 2005)); 
accord Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d 1075, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Agency author-
ity may not be lightly presumed. . . . ‘Thus, we will not presume a delegation of 
power based solely on the fact that there is not an express withholding of such 
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Chamber of Commerce, and other cases have held that congressional 
silence alone is simply insufficient to show that Congress delegated 
interpretive authority to an agency. Hence, any ensuing agency reg-
ulation is not entitled to deference.232 
The alternative presumption—silence-equals-delegated-
power—would lead to virtually unconstrained agency lawmaking. 
Such a presumption “would in effect be blank checks drawn to the 
credit of some administrative officer or board.”233 For example, 
§ 701 does not address the taxation of hedge funds or façade ease-
ments or flying to the moon.234 Under the silence-equals-delegated-
power presumption, the Treasury would have power to regulate all 
three areas because Congress did not withhold such power. 
The silence-equals-delegated-power presumption would require 
Congress to specifically negate any power it did not intend to dele-
gate. “Were courts to presume a delegation of power absent an ex-
press withholding of such power, agencies would enjoy virtually 
limitless hegemony, a result plainly out of keeping with Chevron 
and quite likely with the Constitution as well.”235 The question at 
step one of Chevron is whether Congress has “directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue,”236 not, as Professors Cunningham and 
Repetti contend, whether “the statute addresses the subject matter of 
                                                                                                             
power.’”) (quoting Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 
1995)). 
 232 See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155, 161 
(4th Cir. 1998), aff’d, 529 U.S. 120 (2000); Sierra Club v. EPA, 311 F.3d 853, 
861 (7th Cir. 2002); Am. Petroleum Inst., 52 F.3d at 1120; Ry. Labor Execs.’ 
Ass’n v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 671 (D.C. Cir.), amended by 38 F.3d 
1224 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 233 H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980, at 275 (1946) (the legislative history to the APA). 
 234 See I.R.C. § 701. 
 235 Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (emphasis in 
original) (citations omitted); accord Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 502 
(5th Cir. 2007); Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d at 1082 (“Mere ambiguity in a statute 
is not evidence of congressional delegation of authority.”) (citations omitted); 
Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 137 F.3d 640, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (The 
deference mandated in Chevron “comes into play, of course, only as a conse-
quence of statutory ambiguity, and then only if the reviewing court finds an im-
plicit delegation of authority to the agency.”); Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 29 F.3d at 
671. 
 236 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 
(1984) (emphasis added). 
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the regulation” at all.237 Whether Congress spoke directly to the pre-
cise question at issue is a more complex question than whether Con-
gress was merely silent. Courts should not presume Congress dele-
gated interpretive power to an agency simply because Congress did 
not expressly withhold such power. Were courts to do so, the poten-
tial breadth of implied agency delegation would be simply stunning. 
b.   General Words Are Not Delegation 
Not only is silence insufficient to constitute implied delegation, 
but general words like “necessary” and “needful” are similarly in-
sufficient.238 Hence, the Treasury cannot successfully argue that its 
general grant of authority in § 7805(a) to prescribe all needful rules 
as may be necessary provides implied delegated power. 
Agencies are entitled to deference when they interpret identifia-
ble ambiguous language in a statute.239 When applying Chevron, a 
court asks “whether the regulation is a reasonable interpretation of 
the statute.”240 For example, in Chevron, the issue for the Supreme 
Court was whether the Environmental Protection Agency’s interpre-
tation of the term “stationary source” in a provision of the Clean Air 
Act was valid.241 The language the agency interpreted was identifi-
able: “stationary source.”242 
This axiom is true in the tax world as well; to illustrate, in At-
lantic Mutual Insurance Co. v. Commissioner, the Court applied 
Chevron to uphold the Treasury’s interpretation of the term “reserve 
strengthening” in § 1023(e)(3)(B) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.243 
In both Chevron and Atlantic Mutual, and in thousands more, courts 
                                                                                                             
 237 Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 51. 
 238 See infra text accompanying notes 250–258. 
 239 United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1843 
(2012) (“Chevron and later cases find in unambiguous language a clear sign that 
Congress did not delegate gap-filling authority to an agency; and they find in am-
biguous language at least a presumptive indication that Congress did delegate that 
gap-filling authority.”). 
 240 Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 51. 
 241 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840. 
 242 Id. 
 243 Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm’r, 523 U.S. 382, 391 (1998); accord Loving v. 
IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1016–17 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (rejecting the Treasury’s interpre-
tation of the phrase “representatives of persons before the Department of the 
Treasury” as including tax-return preparers). 
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have applied Chevron to evaluate an agency’s interpretation of iden-
tifiable, ambiguous language in a statute or act.244 
As noted earlier,245 the Treasury claimed that two statutes pro-
vided the agency with interpretive authority: I.R.C. §§ 7805(a) and 
701.246 However, the Treasury did not actually interpret specific lan-
guage in either statute. 
First, the Treasury did not interpret identifiable language in 
§ 7805(a). Section 7805(a) provides in relevant part: “the Secretary 
shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement 
of this title, including all rules and regulations as may be necessary 
by reason of any alteration of law in relation to internal revenue.”247 
This statute is a general grant of authority to the Treasury to issue 
rules and regulations as “needful” and “necessary” to enforce the tax 
code.248 Section 7805(a) does not mention the words “partnerships,” 
“the intent of subchapter K,” the judicially developed anti-abuse 
doctrines, “purposivism,” “literalism,” or even “subchapter K.” 
Thus, the regulation does not interpret any identifiable word or 
words in § 7805(a).249 
The Treasury might argue that it interpreted the words “needful” 
and “necessary.”250 Making this argument, the Treasury might claim 
that the regulation was necessary and needful because those forming 
partnerships were running amok and abusing the tax rules. However, 
general words like “needful” and “necessary” are insufficient alone 
                                                                                                             
 244 For example, in Home Concrete & Supply, 132 S. Ct. at 1839, the majority 
identified and italicized the relevant statutory language: “omits from gross income 
an amount properly includible therein . . . .” See generally William N. Eskridge, 
Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of 
Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 
1094 (2008) (cataloguing all 1014 Supreme Court cases decided between Chevron 
and Hamdan in which a federal agency interpreted a statute). 
 245 See supra Section V.B. 
 246 Subchapter K Anti-Abuse Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 25581 (proposed May 17, 
1994) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 247 I.R.C. § 7805(a). 
 248 Id. 
 249 See id. 
 250 Professors Cunningham and Repetti did not make this argument in their 
article. See Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 53–54 (failing to address 
§ 7805(a)). However, Professor Cunningham has subsequently raised this argu-
ment with me. See Email from James Repetti (Aug. 1, 2014) (on file with author). 
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to provide the ambiguity needed to reach Chevron’s second step, as 
the Fourth Circuit held in Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB.251 
In Chamber of Commerce, the statute at issue provided the 
NLRB with the “authority from time to time to make, amend, and 
rescind . . . such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry 
out the provisions of [the National Labor Relations Act].”252 The 
NLRB promulgated a regulation requiring “[a]ll employers . . . [to] 
post notices to employees, in conspicuous places, informing them of 
their NLRA rights, together with Board contact information and in-
formation concerning basic enforcement procedures.”253 
The NLRB argued that the statute authorized the agency “to is-
sue rules that [were] ‘necessary to carry out’ the provisions of the 
Act.”254 The NLRB contended that the word “necessary” was inher-
ently ambiguous and, thus, that the court must uphold the agency’s 
reasonable interpretation of that term pursuant to Chevron’s second 
step.255 In essence, the NLRB contended that because the word “nec-
essary” was ambiguous, Congress implicitly delegated interpretive 
power to it. 
The court disagreed and explained that “‘[t]he ambiguity must 
be such as to make it appear that Congress either explicitly or im-
plicitly delegated authority to cure that ambiguity [to the 
agency].’”256 Examining the rest of the relevant Act, the court con-
cluded that Congress had not granted the NLRB the power to issue 
the notice-posting rule.257 In other words, the court held that the am-
biguity in a general word like “necessary” was insufficient to con-
stitute implied delegation.258 This holding makes sense: consider 
how expansively the Treasury might regulate if the terms “needful” 
and “necessary” justified any action the agency wanted to take. 
                                                                                                             
 251 Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 721 F.3d 152, 161 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 252 Id. at 155 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 156) (emphasis added). 
 253 Id. at 156 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 104.202(a)). 
 254 Id. at 160 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 156). This language is almost identical to 
§ 7805(a), which gives the Treasury the power “to prescribe all needful rules and 
regulations for the enforcement of [the tax laws] . . . .” I.R.C. § 7805(a). 
 255 Chamber of Commerce, 721 F.3d at 161. 
 256 Id. at 161 (quoting Am. Bar Ass’n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 469 (D.C. Cir. 
2005)). 
 257 Id. at 162. 
 258 Id. at 161. 
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More recently, in King v. Burwell,259 the Supreme Court again 
concluded that a general grant of authority was insufficient. The is-
sue in the case involved a requirement in the Affordable Care Act260 
that tax credits “be allowed” for any “applicable taxpayer,”261 but 
only if the taxpayer has enrolled in an insurance plan through “an 
Exchange established by the State.”262 Many states chose to let the 
federal government establish their exchanges.263 
The Act provided, “The Secretary [of the Treasury] shall pre-
scribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provi-
sions of this section . . . .”264 The Treasury promulgated a regula-
tion265 interpreting the language—”an Exchange established by the 
State”—as allowing tax credits “regardless of whether the Exchange 
[was] established and operated by a State . . . or by HHS.”266 Two 
lower courts had split regarding whether the Treasury’s interpreta-
tion was entitled to deference, but both courts applied the Chevron 
analysis.267 
                                                                                                             
 259 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
 260 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
119. 
 261 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2487 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 36B(a)). 
 262 26 U. S. C. §§ 36B(b)–(c) (emphasis added). 
 263 At the time of the litigation, only sixteen States and the District of Colum-
bia had established exchanges, while thirty-four States opted to have the federal 
government do so. Brief of respondents Sylvia Burwell, Secretary of Health and 
Human Services, et al., No. 14–114, at 11 (filed Jan. 21, 2015). 
 264 I.R.C. § 36B(g). Some commentators have argued that this broad, general 
grant of authority should be sufficient. Leandra Lederman & Joseph C. Dugan, 
King v. Burwell: What Does it Portend for Chevron’s Domain?, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 
75 (citing Syd Gernstein, King v. Burwell: A Win for the President, but a Loss for 
the IRS?, FED. TAX BLOG (June 25, 2015), http://www.bna.com/king-burwell-
win-b17179928783/; Andy Grewal, Brown & Williamson vs. Congressional In-
tent; YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 30, 2015), 
http://www.yalejreg.com/blog/brown-williamson-vs-congressional-intent-by-
andy-grewal). 
 265 Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-2 (2014). The Supreme Court mistakenly calls the reg-
ulation an “IRS rule.” Id. at 2487. 
 266 Id. at 2487 (citing 45 CFR §155.20). 
 267 The Fourth Circuit rejected their arguments. Applying Chevron deference, 
the court first concluded that the statute was ambiguous, and then found Treas-
ury’s interpretation to be reasonable under Chevron’s second step. King v. Bur-
well, 759 F.3d 358, 363 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted 135 S. Ct. 475 (2014). In 
contrast, the D.C. Circuit had concluded just the opposite in another case at nearly 
the same time. The D.C. Circuit found the statute clear at Chevron’s first step and 
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The Supreme Court, refused to apply Chevron at all, calling 
King an “extraordinary case[].”268 The Court reasoned that the ques-
tion of whether plaintiffs had to purchase health care was one of 
such “deep ‘economic and political significance’ [and was so] cen-
tral to this statutory scheme,” that if Congress wished to assign res-
olution of that question to an agency, “[Congress] surely would have 
done so expressly.”269 Because the majority did not find a clear ex-
pression of congressional intent to delegate this issue to the Treasury 
or IRS, the agencies had no such power.270 Instead, the Court inter-
preted the statutory language without regard to the agency’s regula-
tion.271 Thus, general grants of authority are simply insufficient to 
demonstrate congressional intent to delegate interpretive authority. 
Here, not only did the Treasury not interpret specific language 
in § 7805(a), the Treasury did not interpret specific language in 
§ 701.272 Section 701 provides: “A partnership as such shall not be 
subject to the income tax imposed by this chapter. Persons carrying 
on business as partners shall be liable for income tax only in their 
separate or individual capacities.”273 Admittedly, this section con-
tains a number of potentially ambiguous words and phrases that the 
Treasury could have interpreted: for example, what is a “partner-
ship,” and “when are persons carrying on business as partners”? Un-
doubtedly, Congress implicitly delegated power to the Treasury to 
interpret these terms. Had the Treasury interpreted either of these 
terms, then Chevron would be the appropriate standard to apply. 
                                                                                                             
never reached step two. Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014), reh’g 
en banc granted, judgment vacated, No. 14–5018, 2014 WL 4627181 (D.C. Cir. 
Sept. 4, 2014). 
 268 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488. 
 269 Id. at 2489 (emphasis added). 
 270 Id. 
 271 Id. 
 272 Professors Cunningham and Repetti do not specifically explain how § 701 
provides implicit authority to the Treasury. Rather, they seem to suggest that Sub-
chapter K as a whole provides such authority. See Cunningham & Repetti, supra 
note 24, at 53–54 (discussing the legislative history of subchapter K, and then 
noting that “the statute [§ 701] does not address the subject matter of the regula-
tions . . . .”). Subchapter K contains more statutes than just § 701; it is a collection 
of seventy-two different sections. 
 273 I.R.C. § 701. 
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The Treasury might argue that it interpreted one or more of these 
terms by codifying the judicially developed anti-abuse doctrines.274 
Making this argument, the Treasury might contend that those busi-
nesses that met the regulation’s three requirements would be valid 
“partnerships” and their owners would be recognized as “persons 
carrying on business as partners,” while those businesses that did 
not meet the regulation’s requirements would be recast, or disre-
garded. Especially given that § 7805(a) allows the Treasury to pre-
scribe all “needful” and “necessary” rules for tax purposes, this ar-
gument at first glance appears to have some force. 
There are two problems with it, however. First, even if this ar-
gument were accurate, at best it supports the conclusion that the 
Treasury had interpretive authority to codify and modify the judi-
cially developed anti-abuse doctrines to define valid partnerships; it 
provides no support for the conclusion that the Treasury had inter-
pretive authority to issue the theoretical directives. 
Second, the Treasury never claimed to be interpreting either 
term in § 701. Rather, the Treasury claimed to be interpreting “the 
intent of subchapter K.”275 Thus, the Treasury expects deference for 
discerning statutory purpose, or legislative intent, for subchapter K. 
To my knowledge, no court has ever applied Chevron to defer to an 
agency’s characterization of congressional intent or statutory pur-
pose, nor should one.276 An agency’s construction of ambiguous 
statutory language receives deference because courts presume that 
                                                                                                             
 274 Professors Cunningham and Repetti note that “[t]he regulation provides a 
working definition of ‘the intent of subchapter K.’ According to the regulation, 
subchapter K is intended ‘to permit taxpayers to conduct joint business (including 
investment) activities through a flexible economic arrangement without incurring 
an entity-level tax.’” Cunningham and Repetti, supra note 24, at 37 (citing Treas. 
Reg. § 1.701-2(a)). 
 275 Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(b). Further, the NPRM was very clear that “[the anti-
abuse regulation] clarifies the authority of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
to recast those transactions that exploit and misuse the provisions of subchapter 
K in an attempt to avoid tax.” Subchapter K Anti-Abuse Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 25581 
(proposed May 17, 1994) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 276 An email inquiry to the administrative law listserv proved unsuccessful at 
identifying any cases in which a court had applied Chevron deference to an 
agency’s determination of statutory purpose or legislative intent or in which an 
agency had received Chevron deference even though it had not interpreted am-
biguous statutory language. See Email from Linda D. Jellum (Apr. 24, 2014) (on 
file with author along with responses). 
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Congress would want the administering agency, rather than the 
courts, to resolve any ambiguity.277 The agency should resolve these 
ambiguities because deciding the meaning or the reach of a statute 
involves reconciling conflicting policies.278 Agencies are experts in 
their fields and are better than courts at reconciling policies.279 If an 
agency’s choice represents a reasonable accommodation of the con-
flicting policies, and if Congress committed resolution of that choice 
to the agency, then courts should not disturb the agency’s resolution 
unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the 
accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.280 
In contrast, judges, who are experts in statutory interpretation, are 
better suited to determine statutory purpose and legislative intent.281 
With the possible exception of textualists, most judges would 
agree that an agency should consider statutory purpose and legisla-
tive intent in construing the meaning of ambiguous statutory lan-
guage.282 While an agency may use its understanding of legislative 
intent and statutory purpose to interpret ambiguous statutory lan-
guage, the agency’s discernment of that intent and purpose is not 
entitled to Chevron deference. Indeed, an agency’s discernment of 
purpose and intent is not entitled to deference of any kind. Thus, an 
agency’s interpretation of ambiguous language is entitled to Chev-
ron deference, but an agency’s determination of the statutory pur-
pose or the legislative intent is not. 
Moreover, the Treasury did not just discern statutory purpose or 
legislative intent for one statute or a few related statutes; the Treas-
ury attempted to discern that purpose or intent collectively for the 
seventy-two separate statutes that comprise an entire subchapter of 
                                                                                                             
 277 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 
(1984). 
 278 Id. at 844–45. 
 279 See ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 324 (1994). 
 280 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44. 
 281 See Judith S. Kaye, Things Judges Do: State Statutory Interpretation, 13 
TOURO L. REV. 595, 597 (1997) (“Overwhelmingly what federal judges do is in-
terpret federal statutes and federal regulations.”). 
 282 See Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 441, 442 n.4 (1990) (quoting Justice Scalia as saying, “I play 
the game like everybody else . . . . I’m in a system which has accepted rules and 
legislative history is used . . .”); John M. Walker, Jr., Judicial Tendencies in Stat-
utory Construction: Differing Views on the Role of the Judge, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 203, 232 (2001). 
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the Code. Congress enacted subchapter K as part of the 1954 over-
haul of the Internal Revenue Code.283 The Internal Revenue Code of 
1954 is 907 pages long; the new partnership laws were just one sub-
part of this massive act, which was amended in 1986.284 In 1994, 
when the Treasury issued the anti-abuse regulation, the agency did 
not interpret language in just one or even a few specific sections 
within the Tax Reform Act of 1954; rather, the Treasury claimed to 
discern that purpose for all seventy-two separate codified sections 
of the partnership chapter.285 Subchapter K is a collection of statutes, 
a regulatory regime, if you will. It is unclear whether an agency 
should receive Chevron deference for articulating its understanding 
of the purpose for an entire subchapter of the U.S. Code. 
Even if the Treasury were entitled to Chevron deference for dis-
cerning congressional intent or statutory purpose collectively for an 
entire subchapter of the U.S. Code, Chevron deference would still 
be inappropriate, at least as applied to the Treasury’s decision to 
adopt the purposivist directives. Chevron deference does not apply 
to the Treasury’s decision to direct interpreters to adopt one statu-
tory interpretation approach in favor of another. To my knowledge, 
no court has ever applied Chevron deference to an agency’s issuance 
of a theoretical directive. 
In sum, application of Chevron’s second step in this case would 
be unprecedented and unwarranted. Chevron applies when agencies 
interpret identifiable, ambiguous language in a statute that has del-
egated interpretive power to the agency.286 In this case, the Treasury 
interpreted legislative intent and statutory purpose for seventy-two 
separate sections of the Code. Whether a court would reject Chevron 
altogether and apply a de novo standard of review to the Treasury’s 
action287 or would reject the agency’s regulation at Chevron’s first 
step, the anti-abuse regulation is ultra vires, at best, and unconstitu-
tional, at worst. 
                                                                                                             
 283 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 3 (1954). 
 284 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). 
 285 In 1994, subchapter K included seventy-two sections, specifically 26 
U.S.C §§ 701–71. See Subchapter K Anti-Abuse Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 25581 (pro-
posed May 17, 1994) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). It has since been amended 
and now includes seventy-eight. See 26 U.S.C §§ 701–77 (2012). 
 286 See supra text accompanying notes 239–244. 
 287 Rather, the appropriate standard is de novo under the APA § 706(2)(B). 
204 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:152 
C.   Chevron’s Second Step 
When Congress does not delegate power to an agency and the 
agency acts anyway, the agency’s action is unconstitutional.288 
However, when Congress delegates power to an agency but the 
agency does not stay within the bounds of that delegated power, then 
the agency’s action is not unconstitutional; it is ultra vires.289 
In the last section of this Article, I demonstrate that Congress 
did not delegate the power to issue the rules in the anti-abuse regu-
lation. But, if I am wrong and a court were to conclude that Congress 
delegated power to the Treasury, a question remains: is the regula-
tion ultra vires? 
When Congress delegates power, an agency must stay within the 
bounds of its delegated power or the agency’s action is ultra vires.290 
The agency stays within the bounds of its delegated power when the 
statute clearly contemplates the regulation issued.291 To determine 
whether the statute clearly contemplates the regulation issued, 
                                                                                                             
 288 See Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Comm’r, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936). The 
act is unconstitutional because the Federal Constitution vests in the executive the 
executory powers, not legislative powers. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. All legis-
lative powers are vested in Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. Hence, agencies 
cannot act absent delegation from Congress. Congress may delegate legislative 
power to an agency pursuant to the necessary and proper clause. U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 8. However, Congress must provide an agency with intelligible principles to 
guide the exercise of any delegated power. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United 
States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 
474–76 (2001). 
 289 Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 472–74 (1994) (explaining the difference 
between unconstitutional and ultra vires executive acts); Robinson v. Salazar, 885 
F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1029 (E.D. Cal. 2012); City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 
1863, 1869 (2013) (“Both [agencies’] power to act and how they are to act is 
authoritatively prescribed by Congress, so that when they act improperly, no less 
than when they act beyond their jurisdiction, what they do is ultra vires.”); Elec. 
Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 225 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that 
FERC’s issuance of a regulation that regulated retail power was an “ultra vires 
agency action.”); Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. EPA, 537 F.3d 1006, 1019 (9th Cir. 
2008); Iowa League of Cities v. EPA, 711 F.3d 844, 876 (8th Cir. 2013); Loving 
v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that a Service rule regulat-
ing non-attorney, non-CPA tax-return preparers was ultra vires). 
 290 Robinson, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 1029. 
 291 Iowa League of Cities, 711 F.3d at 877 (citing O’Keefe v. McDonnell 
Douglas Corp., 132 F.3d 1252, 1257 (8th Cir.1998)). 
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courts generally turn to Chevron’s second step.292 At Chevron’s sec-
ond step, a court must accept any “permissible,” or “reasonable,” 
agency interpretation.293 In this case, the Treasury’s “interpreta-
tions” were not reasonable because: (1) the theoretical directives 
conflict with Chevron, and (2) the judicially developed anti-abuse 
doctrines were significantly altered. 
1. THE THEORETICAL DIRECTIVES 
The Treasury’s decision to adopt purposivism and reject literal-
ism was unreasonable. As noted, the anti-abuse regulation specifi-
cally allows the Treasury to recast a transaction “even though the 
transaction may fall within the literal words of a particular statutory 
or regulatory provision . . . to achieve tax results that are consistent 
with the intent of subchapter K.”294 It further allows, “[t]he Com-
missioner . . . [to] treat a partnership as an aggregate of its partners 
in whole or in part as appropriate to carry out the purpose of any 
provision of the Internal Revenue Code or the regulations promul-
gated thereunder.”295 With these two provisions, the Treasury has 
directed interpreters to ignore textualism, especially literalism, 
whenever doing so is inconsistent with the Treasury’s understanding 
of the intent of subchapter K or the purposes of any Code provision. 
The directives are unreasonable because they conflict with Chevron. 
Agencies have implied power to interpret statutory language 
when Congress leaves ambiguity.296 When Congress is clear at 
Chevron’s first step, agencies have no interpretive power: “Chevron 
and later cases find in unambiguous language a clear sign that Con-
gress did not delegate gap-filling authority to an agency . . . .”297 For 
example, in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the Su-
preme Court held under Chevron’s first step that “Congress ha[d] 
                                                                                                             
 292 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 
(1984). 
 293 Id.; see Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442 (2014) 
(“Even under Chevron’s deferential framework, agencies must operate ‘within the 
bounds of reasonable interpretation.’”) (quoting City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 
1868). 
 294 Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(b). 
 295 Id. § 1.701-2(e). 
 296 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
 297 United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1843 
(2012). 
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clearly precluded the FDA from asserting jurisdiction to regulate to-
bacco products.”298 The Court reasoned, in part, that if Congress had 
intended to “delegate a decision of such economic and political sig-
nificance” to the agency, then Congress would have delegated far 
more clearly.299 Thus, the Food and Drug Administration had no 
power to interpret the statute.300 
Where statutory text is unambiguous, an agency has no power to 
construe it differently, even to further legislative intent or statutory 
purpose.301 Agencies cannot rewrite unambiguous statutory lan-
guage simply to meet bureaucratic policy goals, however laudable 
those goals may be.302 An agency’s power to administer a federal 
statute and to prescribe rules and regulations to effectuate that stat-
ute is not the power to make law, for Congress can delegate no such 
power.303 Rather, it is the power to adopt regulations to carry into 
effect the will of Congress as expressed in the statute.304 “Agencies 
exercise discretion only in the interstices created by statutory silence 
or ambiguity; they must always ‘give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress.’”305 
                                                                                                             
 298 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 126 (2000); 
accord Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1021–22 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that the 
Treasury’s interpretation of 31 U.S.C. § 330 “fails at Chevron step 1 because it is 
foreclosed by the statute.”). 
 299 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 160. 
 300 Id. at 160–61. 
 301 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43; see Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 
438, 462 (2002) (The agency lacked authority “to develop new guidelines or to 
assign liability in a manner inconsistent with the statute. In the context of an un-
ambiguous statute, [the Court] need not contemplate deferring to the agency’s 
interpretation.”); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 
228–29 (1994) (holding that the FCC’s interpretation of the word “modify” con-
flicted with its ordinary meaning); Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 
216, 220 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“The question is ‘whether the statutory text forecloses 
the agency’s assertion of authority.’”) (quoting City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. 
Ct. 1863, 1871 (2013)); Adams v. U.S. Forest Serv., 671 F.3d 1138, 1146 (9th 
Cir. 2012); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1995); 
Talley v. Mathews, 550 F.2d 911, 919 (4th Cir. 1977). 
 302 See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2445 (2014). 
 303 See supra note 288 and accompanying text. 
 304 See Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Comm’r, 297 U.S. 129, 135 (1936). 
 305 Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2445 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home 
Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 665 (2007)). 
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Despite this truism, the Treasury’s anti-abuse regulation em-
powers the Commissioner to reject transactions that comply literally 
with unambiguous statutory text when the Commissioner deter-
mines that the transactions violate the “intent of subchapter K.” If 
the Commissioner made such a finding in a particular case and that 
case were appealed, it is very possible that the reviewing court, par-
ticularly a court with a more text-focused judge, would reject the 
Commissioner’s decision as unreasonable. Hence, the anti-abuse 
regulation, which empowers the Commissioner to ignore clear text, 
is unreasonable. 
2. THE ANTI-ABUSE DOCTRINES 
Similarly, the Treasury’s adoption and modification of the judi-
cially developed anti-abuse doctrines is unreasonable because the 
Treasury significantly altered and expanded—rather than echoed 
and codified—existing statutory and common law.306 
Under the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the sole authority to 
make law.307 When Congress makes law, it broadly chooses policy 
and then selects the method for achieving that policy. In doing so, 
Congress may leave gaps for agencies to fill.308 While the line be-
tween gap-filling (law-executing) and law-making (legislating) is 
admittedly a fine one, regulations that alter existing statutory and 
common law doctrines cross that line.309 With the anti-abuse regu-
lation, the Treasury significantly changed existing law by creating 
tougher versions of the business-purpose doctrine and the economic-
substance principle and by combining both into one supersized 
test.310 
                                                                                                             
 306 Jellum, Judicial Anti-Abuse Doctrines, supra note 19, at 610–16; see Nel-
son, supra note 92, at 642. 
 307 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1. 
 308 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984). 
 309 See, e.g., Stephenson Trust v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 283, 287 (1983) (taxpayers 
challenged the validity of a Subchapter J regulation—the trusts and estates sub-
chapter); cf. Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716, 756 (2004) 
(“[W]here a taxpayer has satisfied all statutory requirements established by Con-
gress . . . the use of the ‘economic substance’ doctrine to trump ‘mere compliance 
with the Code’ would violate the separation of powers.”), vacated, 454 F.3d 1340 
(Fed. Cir. 2006), quoted in Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 15, at 1947. 
 310 See Banoff, supra note 61, at 1864 (noting that “[t]he antiabuse rule ap-
pears to extend existing law and go beyond congressional principles.”). 
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When the Treasury promulgated the anti-abuse regulation in 
1994, the judicially created anti-abuse doctrines existed, although 
their boundaries were ill-defined.311 Generally, these doctrines re-
quired tax transactions to satisfy both a tax statute’s language as well 
as its underlying purpose.312 Satisfying the literal words of a tax law 
became insufficient. 
Collectively, these doctrines permit the Service to reject a tax-
payer’s characterization of a business transaction that meets the lit-
eral terms of a tax statute when the taxpayer simultaneously seeks 
tax benefits Congress did not intend.313 These doctrines include the 
business-purpose doctrine and the substance-over-form principle.314 
Substance-over-form serves as a background principle, supporting a 
group of related doctrines including the following:315 the step-trans-
action doctrine, the “sham entity” doctrine, and the economic-sub-
stance doctrine.316 While it is not my point in this Article to detail 
                                                                                                             
 311 See Jellum, Judicial Anti-Abuse Doctrines, supra note 19, at 610 (calling 
the legal landscape in this area “opaque” and their parameters “unclear”). 
 312 See Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 20. See generally Cohen, 
supra note 17 (describing and criticizing the legislative development of tax avoid-
ance tests). 
 313 See Galle, supra note 19, at 362; Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 
25–26; Caudill, ABA Comment, supra note 94 (“Transparent devices totally de-
void of any non-tax significance to the parties cannot pass muster even though a 
literal reading of the statutory language might suggest otherwise.”). 
 314 For a thorough overview of these doctrines as they were in 1978, see 
Bittker, supra note 35, 703–23. 
 315 True v. United States, 190 F.3d 1165, 1176 n.11 (10th Cir. 1999) (explain-
ing “both the step transaction and sham transaction doctrines are corollaries of the 
basic substance over form principle”); Yoram Keinan, Rethinking the Role of the 
Judicial Step Transaction Principle and a Proposal for Codification, 22 AKRON 
TAX J. 45, 47–48 (2007) (“Generally, the doctrines that have emerged can be di-
vided into two subtests under the substance-over-form doctrine: (i) the economic 
substance/sham transaction doctrines (with the business purpose doctrine in-
cluded as the subjective prong), and (ii) the step transaction doctrine.”). 
 316 See generally Madison, supra note 20, at 718 (discussing the beginnings 
of these common law doctrines); Blank & Staudt, supra note 25, at 1650–51 (de-
scribing these doctrines in slightly different terms). The economic substance doc-
trine was alternatively, and confusingly, called the sham-transaction doctrine for 
a while. See Madison, supra note 20, at 718 (noting the overlap: “the jurispru-
dence of sham entities overlaps with factual substance-over-form principles. In 
addition, the sham transaction doctrine is often called the economic substance 
doctrine, and transactions discussed in the context of either the sham transaction 
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the creation of these doctrines,317 a brief recap of the law as it existed 
in 1994 is essential to understand how the Treasury significantly al-
tered that law and why its interpretation is, thus, unreasonable. 
The doctrines had their beginnings in 1935, with the seminal 
case of Gregory v. Helvering.318 In that case, a taxpayer had com-
plied literally with the statutory requirements for reorganization;319 
however, the Service refused to recognize the transaction because 
the taxpayer’s only motive in reorganizing was to avoid paying 
taxes.320 In siding with the Service, the Supreme Court developed 
the business-purpose doctrine.321 Pursuant to this doctrine, a trans-
action must serve a bona fide business purpose other than tax avoid-
ance to qualify for beneficial tax treatment.322 
In Gregory, the Court also laid the groundwork for the sub-
stance-over-form principle, or doctrine.323 When denying the tax 
                                                                                                             
doctrine or the economic substance doctrine are often called economic or substan-
tive shams . . . .”). 
 317 For an article that does so, see Jellum, Judicial Anti-Abuse Doctrines, su-
pra note 19, at 589–604. 
 318 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
 319 The relevant statute was § 112 (g) of the Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, 
Pub. L. No. 70-562, 45 Stat. 791 (1928). 
 320 Gregory, 293 U.S. at 469 (citation omitted). 
 321 Id. (criticizing the transaction as being nothing more than an “operation 
having no business or corporate purpose—a mere device which put on the form 
of a corporate reorganization as a disguise for concealing its real character, and 
the sole object and accomplishment of which was the consummation of a precon-
ceived plan, not to reorganize a business or any part of a business”). 
 322 See Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 21. 
 323 The jurisprudence and scholarship use both terms. Compare Falconwood 
Corp. v. United States, 422 F.3d 1339, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (referring to the 
“substance-over-form principle”), and True v. United States, 190 F.3d 1165, 1176 
n.11 (10th Cir. 1999) (same), and Estate of Weinert v. Comm’r, 294 F.2d 750, 
755 (5th Cir. 1961) (referring to the “substance-over-form” principle), and Emily 
Cauble, Rethinking the Timing of Tax Decisions: Does a Taxpayer Ever Deserve 
a Second Chance?, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 1013, 1030 (2012) (using the term “sub-
stance-over-form principles”), and Erick M. Jensen, Legislative and Regulatory 
Responses to Tax Avoidance: Explicating and Evaluating the Alternatives, 57 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 14 (2012) (same), with Rogers v. United States, 281 F.3d 1108, 
1115 (10th Cir. 2002) (discussing the “substance-over-form doctrine”), and Mad-
ison, supra note 20, and Daniel Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules and the Taxation of 
Capital Income, 50 TAX L. REV. 643, 677 (1995) (referring to the “substance over 
form doctrine”). But see Charlene D. Luke, The Relevance Games: Congress’s 
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benefits the taxpayer sought, the Court criticized the transaction as 
“a mere device which put on the form of a corporate reorganization 
as a disguise for concealing its real character . . . .”324 Pursuant to 
the substance-over-form principle, the government can tax the sub-
stance of a transaction rather than the formal steps a taxpayer uses 
to complete it.325 
From the substance-over-form principle, at least two different, 
but related, doctrines emerged: the step-transaction doctrine326 and 
economic-substance doctrine.327 Both doctrines reflect the idea that 
if two transactions have the identical economic outcome, they 
should have the same tax outcome.328 
Economic substance, the more important doctrine for our pur-
poses, actually began life as a principle329 and morphed into a doc-
trine through judicial development.330 Pursuant to the economic-
                                                                                                             
Choices for Economic Substance Gamemakers, 66 TAX LAW. 551, 567 n.85, 581 
n.142 (2013) (using both terms). 
 324 Gregory, 293 U.S. at 469. Congress added a “no device” requirement to 
the Code in 1954. I.R.C. § 368; see generally Stephen Rigsby, The Business Pur-
pose Doctrine in Corporate Divisions, 11 AKRON L. REV. 275, 280–84 (1977) 
(discussing the distinction between the business purpose doctrine and the “no de-
vice” language). 
 325 See Lederman, Economic Substance, supra note 33, at 391; Cunningham 
& Repetti, supra note 24, at 23. 
 326 The “step transaction” doctrine permits the Service to disregard steps in a 
transaction when those steps lack independent significance. Cunningham & 
Repetti, supra note 24, at 23. 
 327 See Madison, supra note 20, at 718 n.135 (citing Karen Nelson Moore, The 
Sham Transaction Doctrine: An Outmoded and Unnecessary Approach to Com-
bating Tax Avoidance, 41 FLA. L. REV. 659, 660–62 (1989)). 
 328 Lederman, Economic Substance, supra note 33, at 435; see Cunningham 
& Repetti, supra note 24, at 23. 
 329 The Supreme Court developed the economic substance principle in 
Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960). In that case, the Court denied tax 
benefits to a taxpayer who paid $91,570 simply to reduce its tax obligation by 
$233,297.68, potentially netting a profit of $141,727.68. Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 
365–66. The Court noted that the transaction did “‘not appreciably affect [the tax-
payer’s] beneficial interest except to reduce his tax . . . .’ For it is patent that there 
was nothing of substance to be realized by [the taxpayer] from this transaction 
beyond a tax deduction.” Id. at 366 (quoting Gilbert v. Comm’r, 248 F.2d 399, 
411 (2d Cir. 1967) (Hand, J., dissenting)). 
 330 The economic-substance doctrine at one point was also called the sham-
transaction doctrine. “‘Sham transaction’ terminology is confusing, however, be-
cause it encompasses ‘shams in fact,’ which are transactions that never occurred, 
2015] DODGING THE TAXMAN 211 
substance principle, a court examines whether the transaction had a 
prospect of profit before taxes.331 In other words, a transaction must 
have a meaningful economic purpose or investor risk to be legiti-
mate.332 And the Service can invalidate a transaction if it lacks eco-
nomic substance independent of tax considerations.333 
In Frank Lyon v. United States,334 the Supreme Court combined 
the business-purpose doctrine and the economic-substance principle 
into a single two-pronged test—the economic-substance doctrine.335 
Under the business-purpose prong, a court assesses the taxpayer’s 
underlying motivation for entering into the transaction.336 Under the 
economic-substance prong, a court examines the transaction to de-
termine whether the purported economic activity would have oc-
curred absent the tax benefits.337 Thus, the business-purpose prong 
focuses on the taxpayer’s intent, while the economic-substance 
prong focuses on the transaction’s effect.338 
When it combined the business-purpose doctrine and the eco-
nomic-substance principle, the Court stated: 
                                                                                                             
as well as ‘shams in substance,’ which lack economic substance. The substantive 
sham cases typically apply the same or similar analysis as that used in economic 
substance cases.” Lederman, Economic Substance, supra note 33, at 391 n.1 (cit-
ing Yoram Keinan, The COLI Cases Through the Looking Glass of the Sham 
Transaction Doctrine, 111 TAX NOTES 327, 330–31 (2006), and citing United 
Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Comm’r, 254 F.3d 1014, 1018 (11th Cir. 2001)). 
 331 See Lederman, Economic Substance, supra note 33, at 391 (arguing that 
the modern economic-substance doctrine should be replaced with an examination 
of congressional intent); Bankman, supra note 52, at 10 (citing Saba P’ship v. 
Comm’r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 684, 720–21 (1999)). 
 332 See Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 364 (discussing the doctrine); Keeler v. Comm’r, 
243 F.3d 1212, 1220 (10th Cir. 2001) (same); Salina P’ship LP v. Comm’r, 80 
T.C.M. (CCH) 686, 695 (2000) (holding that the transaction in question had “a 
valid business purpose independent of tax benefits”); Sheldon v. Comm’r, 94 T.C. 
738, 767 (1990). 
 333 See ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 248 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that 
“‘the transaction [must have] practical economic effects other than the creation of 
income tax losses’” (quoting Jacobson v. Comm’r, 915 F.2d 832, 837 (2d Cir. 
1990)). 
 334 Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978). 
 335 Madison, supra note 20, at 727 (citing Frank Lyon Co., 435 U.S. at 583–
84). 
 336 Lederman, Economic Substance, supra note 33, at 417. 
 337 Id. 
 338 Madison, supra note 20, at 725. 
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[W]here, as here, there is a genuine multiple-party 
transaction with economic substance which is com-
pelled or encouraged by business or regulatory real-
ities, is imbued with tax-independent considerations, 
and is not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features 
that have meaningless labels attached, the Govern-
ment should honor the allocation of rights and duties 
effectuated by the parties.339 
Because this language was unclear regarding the relationship of 
the two prongs, lower courts developed two versions of the eco-
nomic-substance doctrine: one conjunctive and one disjunctive.340 
Courts that used the conjunctive test allowed tax benefits only when 
a transaction had both business purpose and economic substance.341 
Courts that used the disjunctive test allowed tax benefits when a 
transaction had either business purpose or economic substance.342 
                                                                                                             
 339 Frank Lyon Co., 435 U.S. at 583–84 (emphasis added). 
 340 A few courts apply a factors test. See, e.g., Casebeer v. Comm’r, 909 F.2d 
1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990) (explaining that “the Court’s holding in Frank Lyon 
was not intended to outline a rigid two-step analysis . . . [rather] ‘the consideration 
of business purpose and economic substance are simply more precise factors to 
consider in the application of this court’s traditional sham analysis’”) (quoting 
Sochin v. Comm’r, 843 F.2d 351, 354 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
 341 See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 435 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 
2006) (“If the transaction has economic substance, ‘the question becomes whether 
the taxpayer was motivated by profit’ . . . [but] ‘[i]f, however, the court determines 
that the transaction is a sham, . . . the [subjective] inquiry is never made.’”) (quot-
ing Illes v. Comm’r, 982 F.2d 163, 165 (6th Cir. 1992)); Coltec Indus., Inc. v. 
United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[E]ven if the transaction 
has economic substance, a lack of economic substance is sufficient to disqualify 
the transaction without proof that the taxpayer’s sole motive is tax avoidance.”); 
Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund v. United States, 568 F.3d 537, 544 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(“[I]f a transaction lacks economic substance compelled by business or regulatory 
realities, the transaction must be disregarded even if the taxpayers profess a gen-
uine business purpose without tax-avoidance motivations.”); Horn v. Comm’r, 
968 F.2d 1229, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (suggesting that the transaction is a sham if 
it lacks both economic substance and business purpose). 
 342 See, e.g., United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Comm’r, 254 F.3d 1014, 1018 
(11th Cir. 2001) (suggesting that the transaction is a sham if it lacks either eco-
nomic substance or business purpose); Rice’s Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm’r, 752 
F.2d 89, 95 (4th Cir. 1985) (suggesting that the transaction is a sham if it lacks 
both economic substance and business purpose); Black & Decker Corp. v. United 
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When it fashioned the anti-abuse regulation, the Treasury 
adopted these judicial anti-abuse doctrines; however, as I explained 
in an earlier article and will re-cap here, when the Treasury adopted 
these doctrines, it modified them and combined them in new 
ways.343 First, the Treasury strengthened the business-purpose re-
quirement. The judicially developed business-purpose doctrine re-
quired only that a taxpayer have some business purpose344 and al-
lowed recasting only when bad motive was the principal purpose of 
the transaction.345 
In contrast, the Treasury’s anti-abuse regulation provides that 
“[t]he partnership must be bona fide and each partnership transac-
tion or series of related transactions . . . must be entered into for a 
substantial business purpose.”346 In addition to requiring that the 
partnership be bona fide, the anti-abuse regulation permits the Com-
missioner to recast a partnership if it was “formed or availed of in 
                                                                                                             
States, 436 F.3d 431, 441 (4th Cir. 2006) (saying when the taxpayer was moti-
vated by no business purposes and the transaction had no economic substance it 
is a sham) (citing Rice’s Toyota World, 752 F.2d at 91). 
 343 Jellum, Judicial Anti-Abuse Doctrines, supra note 19, at 610–16. 
 344 Nelson, supra note 92, at 645. For example, in Cottage Savings Ass’n v. 
Commissioner, the taxpayer swapped the participation interests of one mortgage 
portfolio for another, solely to realize a tax loss. 890 F.2d 848, 849 (6th Cir. 1989), 
rev’d, 499 U.S. 554 (1991). The Sixth Circuit denied the tax benefits, noting: 
“What is done for the purpose of tax avoidance must, however, have some busi-
ness purpose and not be an economic transaction in form only. The courts will not 
‘exalt artifice above reality.’” Id. at 853 (internal citations omitted). The Supreme 
Court reversed. Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 568 (1991). In up-
holding the transaction, the Court ignored the taxpayer’s tax avoidance motive 
and required very little in the way of a business purpose. Id. Similarly, in Rice’s 
Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, the Fourth Circuit stated: “To treat a trans-
action as a sham, the court must find the taxpayer was motivated by no business 
purposes other than obtaining tax benefits in entering the transaction . . . .” Rice’s 
Toyota World, 752 F.2d at 91 (describing the business-purpose prong of the eco-
nomic-substance doctrine). 
 345 Thompson Jr., supra note 103, at 1396 (acknowledging the change, but 
suggesting that the choice seemed sensible); Cuff, supra note 96 (“The proposed 
regulation changes current law by establishing a general requirement that taxpay-
ers not engage in partnership transactions with ‘a principal purpose’ of avoiding 
tax . . . [when] taxpayers have been generally free to engage in transactions with 
a principal purpose of avoiding tax . . . .”); Comfort, supra note 92 (noting that 
this provision “go[es] far beyond even the most extreme formulations of the busi-
ness purpose doctrine under existing law”). 
 346 Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
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connection with a transaction a principal purpose of which [was] to 
reduce substantially” the partners’ tax liability.347 The regulation al-
lows the Commissioner to recast a transaction when a principal pur-
pose was tax avoidance rather than, as the judicially developed busi-
ness-purpose doctrine allowed, when the principal purpose of the 
transaction was tax avoidance.348 Further, the regulation allows the 
Commissioner to recast a transaction when the taxpayer does not 
have a substantial business purpose for the transaction rather than, 
as the judicially developed business-purpose doctrine allowed, some 
business purpose.349 With these changes, the Treasury increased the 
standard for taxpayers to meet and thereby strengthened its ability 
to challenge a taxpayer’s motivation.350 
Strengthening business purpose was not the only change the 
Treasury made in its regulation. Prior to the regulation’s promulga-
tion, no court had included all of the judicially created anti-abuse 
doctrines and principles in one conjunctive test.351 The closest such 
test—the economic-substance doctrine—included just two anti-
abuse doctrines, business purpose and economic substance, joined 
conjunctively or disjunctively.352 In contrast, the Treasury specifi-
cally incorporated all of the judicially developed substance-over-
form principles into one single, conjunctive test.353 And it combined 
all of these principles without identifying specifically which princi-
ples it was including. The regulation provides simply that “[t]he 
form of each partnership transaction must be respected under sub-
stance over form principles.”354 Which substance-over-form princi-
ples should be respected is not clear. For example, although the anti-
abuse regulation does not separately refer to the step-transaction 
doctrine or the economic-substance doctrine, presumably, the Treas-
ury intended to include both of these doctrines. Thus, the Treasury 
combined all of the substance-over-form principles and, thus, super-
sized the judicially created anti-abuse doctrines. 
                                                                                                             
 347 Id. § 1.701-2(b) (emphasis added). 
 348 Jellum, Judicial Anti-Abuse Doctrines, supra note 19, at 612. 
 349 Id. 
 350 Sowell, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 81–88 (describing 
transactions to which the Treasury claimed the anti-abuse regulation applied). 
 351 See Jellum, Judicial Anti-Abuse Doctrines, supra note 19, at 611. 
 352 Id. at 622. 
 353 Id. 
 354 Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(a)(2). 
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Strengthening business purpose and joining all of the judicially 
created anti-abuse doctrines were not the only changes the Treasury 
made when it promulgated the anti-abuse regulation. The Treasury 
also included an optional “proper reflection of income” prong.355 
Pursuant to this prong, “the tax consequences under subchapter K to 
each partner of partnership operations and of transactions between 
the partner and the partnership must accurately reflect the partners’ 
economic agreement and clearly reflect the partner’s income . . . .”356 
This “clear reflection of income” prong was never part of the judi-
cially developed anti-abuse doctrines.357 Although there was some 
support for this requirement within other statutes in subchapter K, 
the existing statutes were not quite this broadly applicable.358 While 
some have suggested that the clear reflection and allocation of in-
come factors made this prong of the anti-abuse regulation superflu-
ous, the prong actually expanded existing law.359 
Consequently, with the anti-abuse regulation, the Treasury al-
tered existing law, both statutory and “common law,”360 in a number 
of ways. First, the Treasury strengthened the common law’s require-
ment of business purpose by allowing the Commissioner to recast a 
transaction when a principal purpose was tax avoidance and the tax-
payer did not otherwise have a substantial business purpose for the 
transaction.361 Second, the Treasury crafted a super-sized anti-abuse 
                                                                                                             
 355 See id. § 1.701-2(a)(3). 
 356 Id. 
 357 See Jellum, Judicial Anti-Abuse Doctrines, supra note 19, at 611. 
 358 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 446 (“If no method of accounting has been regularly used 
by the taxpayer, or if the method used does not clearly reflect income, the com-
putation of taxable income shall be made under such method as, in the opinion of 
the Secretary, does clearly reflect income.”); id. § 482 (allowing the Secretary to 
allocate income among businesses to “clearly . . . reflect the income of any 
such . . . businesses”). 
 359 See Marino, supra note 18, at 174; Nelson, supra note 92, at 646–47. 
 360 Technically, “‘[c]ommon law’ refers to that body of governing principles, 
mainly substantive, expounded by the common-law courts of England in deciding 
cases before them.” William B. Stoebuck, Reception of English Common Law in 
the American Colonies, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 393, 393 (1968). In this Article, 
I use the term more colloquially to mean simply judge-made legal doctrine. 
 361 See supra text accompanying notes 344–350. 
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test, which, while incorporating the common-law anti-abuse doc-
trines, also combined them in new ways.362 The super-sized test in-
cludes a tougher business-purpose element and all of the substance-
over-form principles in one conjunctive test.363 Moreover, the super-
sized test includes an optional third prong—the proper-reflection-
of-income prong—which did not exist in this form in the common 
law or the Code.364 In sum, the anti-abuse regulation significantly 
increased the standard taxpayers had to meet to receive tax benefits 
under subchapter K. 
While Professors Cunningham and Repetti suggest that “[t]he 
implied delegation from Congress necessarily included the ability to 
modify and adapt judicial doctrines existing in 1954 to changed cir-
cumstances,”365 I disagree. The Treasury’s interpretation is unrea-
sonable because it transforms and enormously expands the Treas-
ury’s regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization. 
When an agency discovers in a “long-extant statute an unheralded 
power to regulate ‘a significant portion of the American economy,’ 
[the Supreme Court] typically greet[s] its announcement with a 
measure of skepticism. [The Court] expect[s] Congress to speak 
clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast ‘eco-
nomic and political significance.’”366 Here, the Treasury assumed 
the power to significantly alter the judicially developed anti-abuse 
doctrines (thereby assuming the power to recast potentially thou-
sands of partnership transactions) and to select a method of statutory 
interpretation. Yet Congress did not clearly authorize either power. 
Administrative agencies have no power to make law, for Con-
gress can delegate no such power.367 Rather, agencies administer 
federal statutes by promulgating rules and regulations to effect the 
will of Congress as expressed by the governing, or enabling, stat-
ute.368 “A regulation which does not do this, but operates to create a 
                                                                                                             
 362 See supra text accompanying notes 351–355. 
 363 Id. 
 364 Jellum, Judicial Anti-Abuse Doctrines, supra note 19, at 614. 
 365 Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 54. 
 366 Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014) (quoting 
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159–60 (2000)). 
 367 See Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Comm’r, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936). 
 368 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 
(1984) (“‘The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally 
created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making 
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rule out of harmony with the statute, is a mere nullity.”369 “Although 
regulations are entitled to considerable weight, ‘[the Treasury] may 
not usurp the authority of Congress by adding restrictions to a statute 
which are not there.’”370 Indeed, “the question a court faces when 
confronted with an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers 
is always, simply, whether the agency has stayed within the bounds 
of its statutory authority.”371 
A regulation is unreasonable when it extends beyond the scope 
of Congress’s implied delegation of authority.372 The anti-abuse reg-
ulation is unreasonable because it extends beyond any express or 
implied congressional delegation. To be precise, the Treasury cre-
ated new law by combining and altering existing common and stat-
utory law.373 The Treasury has no authority to make new law;374 
                                                                                                             
of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.’”) (quoting Mor-
ton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)). 
 369 Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co., 297 U.S. at 134. 
 370 Stephenson Trust v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 283, 288 (1983) (quoting Estate of 
Boeshore v. Comm’r, 78 T.C. 523, 527 (1982)); see Am. Auto. Ass’n v. United 
States, 367 U.S. 687, 697 (1961) (“[C]ourts should be wary of broad-scale incor-
poration of the doctrine of ‘tax avoidance,’ or ‘business purpose,’ or ‘sham’ in an 
area so fraught with its own particular problems and nuances. At the very least, 
we are required to limit those judicially developed doctrines to the situations 
which they were intended to cover.”), quoted in Stephenson Trust, 81 T.C. at 291. 
 371 Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting City of Ar-
lington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013)); See id. at 1022 (holding that the 
Treasury had no authority to regulate tax-return preparers, especially given that it 
denied having such power for many years). 
 372 Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 49 (citing Whitman v. Am. 
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779 (1960) (rejecting the Commissioner’s interpretation of a statute that was 
based on a committee report when it differed from the text of the statute), aff’d, 
289 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1961); Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 446–47 
(1936) (invalidating a Treasury regulation that conflicted with the statute); Lynch 
v. Tilden Produce Co., 265 U.S. 315, 320–22 (1924) (holding that the statutory 
definition of adulterated butter could not be limited to a percentage of moisture in 
the butter but required an element of intent to adulterate); Miller v. United States, 
294 U.S. 435, 439–40 (1935). 
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hence, the anti-abuse regulation is unreasonable and, therefore, ultra 
vires. 
CONCLUSION 
Abusive tax shelters are certainly a problem, and one that is not 
going away. The government has strong reasons for wanting to com-
bat the abuse with any legitimate means it can find. The Treasury’s 
frustration with the abuse of the partnership tax laws, in particular, 
stems from the broad latitude businesses have to structure partner-
ship agreements. Partnerships and other pass-through entities re-
main a commonly used entity form; however, the partnership laws 
provide a number of opportunities for tax abuse. The anti-abuse reg-
ulation empowers the Service to look at the results of each transac-
tion to see whether abusive behavior has occurred (such as income 
shifting and abusive deductions). The Treasury’s goal to stop abuse 
was indeed laudable. 
While the goal behind the regulation cannot be faulted, the anti-
abuse regulation is simply not a legitimate choice to implement that 
goal. The Treasury assumed power that was never delegated to it; 
hence, the regulation is unconstitutional or, alternatively, ultra vires. 
As for the theoretical directives, Congress had authority to del-
egate the power to promulgate such directives to the Treasury. Some 
have argued that because Congress could legitimately select an ap-
proach to judicial interpretation, Congress, by never making such a 
choice, implicitly delegated this choice to the Treasury. This argu-
ment is flawed. Congress has no such power, and Congress cannot 
delegate power it does not have. Additionally, Congress cannot del-
egate power through silence or general words. As for codifying the 
judicially developed anti-abuse doctrines, Congress neither implic-
itly nor explicitly delegated this authority to the Treasury. 
In addition, even if one could find an implicit delegation of ei-
ther power to the Treasury, the agency’s action was ultra vires be-
cause the regulation exceeds the limits of any delegated power. Gen-
erally, courts turn to Chevron deference to determine whether agen-
cies stay within the bounds of implicitly delegated power. Yet, def-
erence is simply inappropriate here. Under Chevron, deference is 
appropriate when an agency interprets ambiguous language in a stat-
ute or, perhaps, a few statutes. While agencies have the authority to 
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interpret ambiguous statutory language and fill gaps, courts should 
not defer to an agency’s understanding of the statutory purpose for 
seventy-two different statutes in the Code or for the intent of the 
legislative body enacting those seventy-two different sections. The 
Treasury did not interpret ambiguous language in a statute. Rather, 
the Treasury discerned purpose and intent for an entire subchapter 
of the Code, containing seventy-two different statutes. Deference is 
inappropriate. 
Moreover, even assuming deference is appropriate, the Treas-
ury’s anti-abuse regulation fails Chevron’s second step for two rea-
sons. First, the Treasury included two theoretical directives, which 
directly conflict with Chevron. Second, the Treasury’s attempt to 
codify the judicially developed anti-abuse doctrines was unreasona-
ble because the Treasury significantly expanded existing common 
and statutory law. While agencies have the power to fill gaps and 
interpret ambiguous statutory language, they have no power to ex-
pand existing common or statutory law without clearly delegated 
authority. In sum, “we are probably better off with an IRS forced to 
follow statutory law and to look to Congress to clean up the statutes 
and to the courts for equity.”375 
                                                                                                             
 375 Mark A. Luscombe, Statutory Interpretation: A Taxpayer-Friendly, and 
More Flexible, IRS, 80 TAXES 3, 4 (2002). 
